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Abstract 
During the processing of verbs, readers form internal representations of the events 
described by those verbs. Two key elements in the construction of event representations are 
temporal information, given by the verbs that describe the represented events, and the visual 
perspective from which the events are represented. The current study is composed of two 
experiments aimed at examining the roles these two factors play in event representation. 
Specifically, the study aimed to determine how temporal information and visual perspective are 
represented during event imagination. 
 Experiment 1 investigated the role of temporal information associated with verbs, given 
by grammatical aspect (GA) and lexical aspect (LA). GA refers to morphosyntactic structures 
that variably focus on events as being ongoing or as having ended. Experiment 1 was concerned 
with two past-tense forms of GA: the imperfective (e.g., I was acting), which places focus on the 
ongoing portion of an event; and the perfective (e.g., I acted), which places focus on the 
completion of an event. Lexical aspect refers to the property of a verb as possessing or lacking a 
natural endpoint. Experiment 1 was concerned with accomplishment verbs (e.g., build), which 
possess natural endpoints, and activity verbs (e.g., act), which lack natural endpoints. 
Participants read short verb phrases and imagined themselves participating in the described 
events. During imagination, slow-cortical potential amplitudes (SCPs) were recorded using 
electroencephalography (EEG), as an index of cognitive effort associated with imagining. 
Participants also completed behavioural measures on the temporal and sensory properties of their 
imagined events. SCP results indicated that imagining events based on activity cues was more 
effortful when cues were given in the perfective than when they were given in the imperfective 
aspect. In contrast, accomplishments were associated with more effortful imagining when given 
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in the imperfective than when given in the perfective aspect. Differences in GA/LA were also 
found to lead to changes in the tendency to view events from either the first-person or the third-
person perspective, as indicated by self-report measures. 
 Experiment 2 used cue phrases containing imperfective activity verbs and participants 
were prompted to either take a first or third person perspective when imagining events. SCP 
results indicated that greater cognitive effort was associated with imagining activities from the 
third-person perspective as compared to the first-person perspective. 
Results for both experiments are discussed further in terms of topographical differences 
in SCP negativity and differences in behavioural ratings. This research represents a novel 
examination of how the imagination process is constrained by the different types of temporal 
information present in verb cues and the perspective from which imagined events are 
represented. 
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Time, Perspectives, Verbs, and Imagining Events 
When a person imagines an event, they combine the disparate elements of that event to 
form a coherent mental representation. These elements include one’s sensory experience, the 
entities and objects in the event, and the location in which the event takes place. Further, all of 
these elements can vary in the level of vividness with which they are imagined and the level of 
personal importance associated with the event. Event representations also vary as a result of 
temporal information. For example, varying representations of duration are associated with 
specific events, and particular event segments (beginning, middle, end) may be more salient than 
others (Madden & Ferretti, 2009). In the process of representing an event, these elements are 
combined to form a situation model (Zwaan & Radavansky, 1998). 
Various linguistic properties guide the temporal layout of a situation model. For example, 
tense is responsible for defining an event’s relative date of occurrence as taking place in the past, 
present, or future. Moving the narrative time line causes the updating of situation models and this 
creates cognitive difficulty (Anderson, 1983; Ditman & Kuperberg, 2008; Dwivedi, Phillips, 
Laguë-Beauvais, & Baum, 2006; Zwaan, 1996). Furthermore, real-world knowledge plays a role 
in defining an event’s duration and whether or not they include a natural temporal endpoint (i.e., 
telicity). For example, writing a cheque might take a few minutes while writing a book might 
take a few years. However, such durations can only be estimated with knowledge of performing 
these actions. 
The current project is comprised of two experiments. Experiment 1 investigated two 
properties associated with verbs that guide temporal organization in situation models of 
individual events: Grammatical aspect (GA) and lexical aspect (LA; Vendler, 1957). These 
factors play a role in shaping event representations as being ongoing or completed, as having 
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natural temporal endpoints or no endpoints, and variably place focus on specific segments of an 
event (see Madden & Ferretti, 2009, for a review). The main goal of this experiment was to 
elucidate the manner in which these temporal variables interact to constrain people’s ability to 
imagine events. 
While Experiment 1 was primarily concerned with the cognitive effort associated with 
imagining events, results from this experiment revealed that differences in grammatical and 
lexical aspect may also lead to differences in peoplepleened with the imagine events from the 
first-person or the third-person perspective. Experiment 2 was conducted to investigate how 
these differences in perspective affect the cognitive effort associated with imagining events 
without natural endpoints (i.e., activities). The framework for Experiment 2 is therefore based on 
the outcome of Experiment 1. As such, Experiment 1 is described first and is preceded by an 
overview of various investigations on GA, studies which pertain to the SCP methodology used in 
the current study, and examinations of the neurophysiology of event imagination. Experiment 2 
is described thereafter. 
GA and the mental representation of events 
GA is morphosyntactic information that references the temporal development of events 
as either ongoing or completed (Comrie, 1976; Dowty, 1979). Three forms of GA exist in the 
English language: the imperfective, the perfective, and the perfect. The imperfective (e.g., I was 
dancing) references events as ongoing, whereas the perfective (e.g., I danced) and perfect (e.g., I 
had danced) forms references events as completed. 
Previous psycholinguistic research on GA has shown that it plays a key role in the 
construction of event representations during language comprehension, as well as affecting the 
availability of information in situation models (Becker, Ferretti, & Madden-Lombardi, 2013; 
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Carreiras, Carriedo, Alonso, & Fernández, 1997; Ferretti, Rohde, Kehler, & Crutchley, 2009; 
Ferretti, Kutas, & McRae, 2007; Magliano & Schleich, 2000). 
Carreiras et al. (1997) investigated the manner in which GA and temporal associations 
between characters impact mental representations. In this experiment, participants read short 
stories about two characters. Each story began with two sentences, each describing one of the 
characters. These descriptions were followed by the critical sentence, which provided temporal 
information on the main character and was phrased in the imperfective or the perfect aspect. 
Critical sentences were structured such that they did or did not describe both characters as 
concurrently being in the same location. Critical sentences were followed by 0, 1, or 2 filler 
sentences before the presentation of a test word. As shown in the example below, the test word 
for experimental trials was the name of the main character. 
1. John works as a waiter in a restaurant. 
2. Mary eats there every day. 
3. John was finishing / had finished his shift 
4. when Mary arrived at the restaurant. 
5. She asked for the dish of the day. 
6. She read the newspaper while waiting for the food. 
Test word: John 
The results showed that reaction times were faster when the critical sentence was phrased 
in the imperfective as compared to the perfect (i.e., when both characters were concurrently in 
the same location, as compared to when they were not). It was also found that greater sentence 
distance led to slower reaction times to the test word. These results were taken to indicate that 
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differences in syntax-based temporal information led to associations and disassociations in 
mental models. 
GA has also been found to interact with both knowledge of real-world event durations 
and working memory capacity. These factors have been shown to influence representations of 
multiple events co-occurring or occurring in sequence in narratives (Magliano & Schleich, 2000; 
Mozuraitis, Chambers, & Daneman, 2013). For example, Magliano and Schleich (2000) 
conducted a series of experiments in which participants read short narratives that varied by 
aspect (perfective/imperfective) in the critical sentence. A question, intended to determine if the 
event in the critical sentence was perceived as ongoing or completed, appeared after 1 to 4 
subsequent sentences. Individual experiments examined the manner in which aspect interacts 
with knowledge of real-world event durations and participants’ working memory spans. In 
general, the results indicated that participants were more likely to perceive events initially given 
in the imperfective, as opposed to the perfective, as being ongoing at the time of the questions. 
Furthermore, the likelihood of perceiving an imperfective event as ongoing decreased as the 
number of sentences separating the critical sentence and the response prompt increased. This 
decrease was more exaggerated when short-duration, as opposed to long-duration events, were 
described in the imperfective aspect. This interaction was not found for perfective critical 
sentences. 
Response times to the probe questions that followed the critical sentence did not vary as a 
direct function of either grammatical aspect or working-memory span. However, an interaction 
between these factors was observed. For questions following the critical sentence by 4 sentences, 
individuals with high working-memory spans responded more quickly when the critical sentence 
was in the imperfective than when it was in the perfective. This GA-based difference in response 
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time was not observed for the low-working-memory participants. This result was taken to 
indicate that high-span individuals are more capable of maintaining discourse information in a 
high state of activation when imperfective aspect references events as ongoing in the narrative. 
Madden and Zwaan (2003) have also shown that participants associate imperfective and 
perfective stimuli with visual depictions of ongoing and completed events, respectively. In one 
experiment, participants were given a sentence written in the imperfective or the perfective 
aspect and were asked to select from two pictures the one that best represented the sentences. 
One of these pictures depicted the described event as ongoing, while the other picture depicted it 
as having been completed. Participants were more likely to associate the imperfective and 
perfective stimuli with the ongoing and completed event depictions, respectively. Another 
experiment aimed to determine whether or not verb aspect is implicitly associated with ongoing 
and completed states, in the previously determined manner. Participants in this experiment were 
again exposed to imperfective and perfective stimuli but were shown only a single picture 
afterwards and were required to quickly as possible to indicate if the picture accurately captured 
the preceding sentences. The results showed that for perfective sentences participants were faster 
to respond to pictures depicting completed events as compared to those depicting ongoing 
events. Alternatively, this difference was not seen following the two different pictures for 
imperfective sentences. 
The influence of GA has also recently been shown to influence event representations in 
domains of cognitive processing other than language comprehension (Ferretti & Katz, 2010; 
Matlock, Sparks, Mathews, Hunter, & Huette, 2012; Salomon, Magliano, & Radvansky, 2013). 
For example, Salomon et al. (2013) demonstrated that GA can influence the ease of solving 
insight problems. Participants in their research were posed with two sets of insight problems, 
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each of which required participants to focus on a certain aspect of the problems to realize the 
solution. One set of problems required participants to focus on the action taking place in each 
problem, while the other set required participants to focus on the gender of a character in each 
problem. 
In this study, imperfective phrasing, rather than perfective phrasing, was found to lead to 
correct responses to problems requiring focus on actions. In contrast, a perfective advantage was 
found for problems where finding the solution required a focus on gender information. For those 
solutions that required a focus on gender, imperfective phrasing was concluded to have detracted 
from problem solvability by drawing attention to irrelevant action information. Thus, action 
information distracted participants from focussing the gender information required to develop 
correct solutions. This result was interpreted as indicating that the imperfective aspect leads to 
events being represented with a focus on the actions taking place in those events. 
Matlock et al. (2012) has also shown that GA can bias the way events are communicated 
and conceptualized. This research investigated how recordings of vehicle accidents are perceived 
according to the form of GA with which questions regarding the event are posed. Participants in 
this study were shown recordings of vehicle accidents and asked “What was happening?” 
(imperfective) or “What happened?” (perfective). Responses were analyzed in terms of word and 
gesture frequencies. It was found that motion verbs were more often used to respond to 
imperfective questions than to perfective questions. Conversely, non-motion verbs were more 
often used to respond to questions phrased in the perfective, as compared to the imperfective. It 
was also found that participants made a greater number of references to reckless driving 
behaviours when the question was posed in the imperfective as compared to when it was posed 
in the perfective. 
TIME, PERSPECTIVES, VERBS, AND IMAGINING EVENTS 13 
 
Gesture frequencies were analyzed in terms of iconic gestures and beat gestures. Iconic 
gestures are those that provide information on motion, size, and spatial information. In contrast, 
beat gestures are shorter movements that convey no semantic information. Questions in the 
imperfective, as compared to the perfective, were found to evoke more iconic gestures. In 
contrast, questions in the perfective, as compared to the imperfective, were found to evoke more 
beat gestures. Thus, it was concluded that information on actions seems to become more vivid 
and accessible, when questions are phrased in the imperfective rather than the perfective. This 
research represents a situation in which GA plays a clear role in modifying representations of 
key real-world events and highlights the benefit of further research into the constraints placed 
upon event representation by variations in GA and other linguistic factors. 
Research on GA has also investigated how GA influences event representations during 
autobiographical memory (AM) retrieval.  Ferretti and Katz (2010) presented participants with 
cues consisting of imperfective, perfective, and perfect sentence cues describing personal events 
(e.g., I had written an exam in high school). Participants then read these cues, recalled AMs 
based on the cues, and answered a questionnaire on the details of their recalled AMs. Results 
indicated that imperfective cues more often led to memories being recalled from the first-person 
perspective, as if reliving the memory, as compared to the other two forms of aspect. Other 
findings demonstrated that the temporal segments of recalled events were constrained such that 
imperfective cues more likely led to a memory featuring the middle of an event, whereas perfect 
cues more likely led to a memory featuring the end of an event. 
Ferretti et al. (2009) has also examined the role played by GA in the formation of 
situation models during reading tasks that require coreferential processing. Their first study had 
participants read sentences that each describe the transfer of an object between two people who 
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differed in gender (e.g., “Mary handed a book to Tom”). This gender difference was included to 
ensure that any pronouns in subsequent sentences would be unambiguous. These sentences were 
phrased in either the imperfective or the perfective aspect. Using these stimuli, the researchers 
aimed to determine how GA influences the relative salience of the source referent (the person 
transferring the object) and the goal referent (the person to whom the object is transferred). 
Participants read the sentences describing the object transfer and then wrote another sentence 
that could plausibly follow each of the first sentences. Their results showed that continuations 
most often made reference to the goal of stimulus sentences. Additionally, it was found that 
references to the goal were more often made following perfective than imperfective sentences. 
These results were taken to indicate that perfective phrasing places focus on the end portion of an 
event. Thus, salience for the goal referent was increased by perfective phrasing relative to 
imperfective phrasing. 
The second experiment conducted by Ferretti et al. (2009) used ERP methodology to 
examine how changes in GA influence coreferential processing. Participants in this experiment 
were shown sentence stimuli, each consisting of two sentences: A sentence that was similar to 
those used in the first experiment and a subsequent sentence that used an unambiguous pronoun 
that had a gender consistent with either the preceding source or goal entity. For each sentence, it 
was predicted that participants would develop expectations from the first sentence about who is 
likely to be mentioned next in the subsequent sentence. Further, it was predicted that the pronoun 
would more often be expected to refer to the goal than the source. It was also predicted that 
pronouns would refer to the goal more often following perfective sentences, as compared to 
imperfective sentences. In order to examine participants’ expectations, the researchers analyzed 
two ERP components: Left anterior negativity (LAN) and the P600 component. LAN amplitudes 
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have previously been established as reflecting the processing of morphosyntactic violations, 
including pronouns mismatching referents according to gender (Coulson, King, & Kutas, 1998; 
Osterhout & Holcomb, 1992). The P600 component has been established as reflecting syntactic 
violations, complexity, and reanalysis (Coulson, King, & Kutas, 1998; Osterhout & Holcomb, 
1992). ERP amplitudes indicated that greater cognitive effort was required to process pronouns 
that referred to the source than was required to process those that referred to the goal. Following 
perfective, but not imperfective sentences, P600 results indicated that participants recognized a 
gender mismatch when pronouns referred to the source, as compared the goal. Analysis of the 
LAN revealed a similar pattern of results to that of the P600. This result, in combination with the 
aforementioned P600 result, was taken to indicate that perceived gender mismatches between 
pronouns and their referents are perceived as morphosyntactic violations. 
Ferretti et al. (2007) conducted a series of experiments in which they looked at the role of 
GA in activating event knowledge. Their first experiment focussed on how event representation 
is altered by the actions described by verbs and the locations in which those actions take place. In 
this semantic priming experiment, participants were presented with action-location pairs, with 
actions given in either the imperfective (e.g., was skating) or the perfect (e.g., had skated). Each 
action-location pair consisted either of a verb and a location commonly associated with that verb 
(e.g., was skating–arena) or a verb and a location that is not associated with that verb (e.g., was 
praying–arena). Participants silently read verb phrases to themselves and then named the target 
locations aloud. It was found that naming latencies were shorter for related pairs than for 
unrelated pairs, but only for imperfective verb phrases. 
           Ferretti et al.’s second experiment investigated the influence of GA on the content of 
sentences. In this experiment, participants wrote continuations to sentences phrased in the 
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imperfective (e.g., The cow was grazing...) or the perfect aspect (The cow had grazed…). 
Sentences were analyzed in terms of phrase type with which they were completed: locative 
prepositional, other prepositional, noun, adverb, and conjunctive. It was found that locative 
prepositional phrases were more often used to complete imperfective sentence fragments than 
they were to complete perfect sentence fragments. This difference indicates that imperfective 
phrasing, relative to perfect phrasing, places a greater amount of emphasis on location 
information. In contrast, noun phrases and adverbial information were more often used to 
complete perfective than imperfective sentence fragments. It was concluded that perfect aspect 
places a greater amount of emphasis on direct objects than does imperfective aspect. Conjunctive 
phrases were equally likely to be used to complete either imperfective or perfect sentence 
fragments. 
In their third experiment, the sentences were designed to describe actions occurring in 
locations where they would be commonly expected to occur (high-expectancy condition, e.g., 
“The diver was snorkelling in the ocean”) or would not be commonly expected to occur (low-
expectancy condition, e.g., “The diver was snorkelling in the pond”). Sentences in this 
experiment were phrased either in the imperfective or in the perfect aspect. EEG was recorded as 
participants read sentences. Differences in two ERP components were expected and analyzed: 
The N400 and slow cortical Potentials (SCPs). The N400 is a negative amplitude that peaks 300-
500 ms following stimulus onset. In language processing, the N400 is often used as an index of 
semantic expectancy (Kutas & Hillyard, 1980). As such, Ferretti et al. (2007) analyzed N400 
amplitudes as an index of locations expectancy in sentence processing. The researchers also 
analyzed SCP amplitudes as an index of cognitive load associated with the processing and 
integration of locative prepositional phrases in sentences. 
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Following the reading of sentences in the imperfective, but not in the perfect aspect, 
participants were found to exhibit more negative N400 amplitudes in response to low-expectancy 
versus high-expectancy locations. This result was consistent with those of the previous 
experiments. The researchers concluded that imperfective stimuli are more likely to cause 
participants to develop expectations for common event locations, whereas locative information in 
perfect sentences is less expected, regardless of location commonality. As is indicated by the 
difference in SCP amplitudes, these violations of expectation also lead to greater difficulty of 
information integration into sentence representations. Collectively, these experiments indicate 
that location information is more accessible based on imperfective stimuli than based on perfect 
stimuli. 
The findings discussed above make it clear that GA plays a key role in influencing event 
representations during a range of tasks that involve different cognitive processes. The present 
research extends this body of research by examining how GA influences the ease of imagining 
different categories of events. Next we describe the type of events examined in the current study. 
LA and the mental representation of events 
While GA can place focus on the ongoing portion or the endpoint of an event, some 
events denoted by verbs inherently do or do not possess natural endpoints (Comrie, 1976; 
Dowty, 1979, Lyons, 1977). This property of LA refers to the nature of a verb as being telic 
(possessing a natural endpoint) or atelic (lacking a natural endpoint). Accomplishment verbs 
such as “build” are classified as telic because they have a natural endpoint (i.e., something gets 
built). In contrast, an activity verb such as “act” is atelic because it is not necessarily associated 
with a natural endpoint in the absence of a temporally constraining context (e.g., I acted in a 
Broadway musical; Vendler, 1957). 
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Recent research by Yap et al. (2009) has shown that people have more difficulty 
constructing mental representations of events when GA forces completion status to events 
without natural endpoints (activities), or when GA forces ongoing status to events with natural 
endpoints (accomplishments). Participants in this research heard sentences describing events that 
contained an accomplishment or activity verb and were phrased in imperfective or perfective 
aspect. Following each auditory stimulus, participants were presented with a pair of pictures, 
which depicted two variations of the previously heard event: the ongoing event or the event’s 
completion state. Participants were, as quickly as possible, to select the picture most closely 
described by the preceding sentence. Response times for activity sentences were faster when 
stimuli were phrased in the imperfective as compared to the perfective aspect. Conversely, 
accomplishment sentences led to faster selection times when phrased in the perfective as 
compared to the imperfective aspect. 
The interaction between GA and LA has also recently been examined in an ERP study in 
the context of information availability in situation models (Becker et al., 2013). Participants in 
this research read a set of short stories that contained a critical sentence describing an activity or 
accomplishment given in the imperfective or the perfective aspect. The critical sentence was 
followed by a sentence describing either a temporally long or a short intervening event. The 
subsequent probe sentence contained the target word that referred to the event in the critical 
sentences. As the N400 component is known to be more negative for words that are semantically 
more difficult to integrate with the context (Kutas & Hillyard, 1980; Brown, Hagoort, & Kutas, 
2000), this component was examined to determine the availability of preceding information at 
the time of the onset of the target words. The results of this study showed that information was 
more available if it had previously been given in the imperfective as compared to the perfective 
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aspect. However, this was only the case when the critical sentence described an accomplishment 
and was followed by a buffer sentence that described a short intervening event. This result 
provides empirical evidence of the electrophysiological differences in temporal representation, 
based on the matching/mismatching temporal information given by GA and LA. 
These results highlight the importance of GA and LA in influencing mental 
representations of events. While a large body of previous research has examined the role of GA 
in event representations, only a few studies have examined the interaction between GA and LA. 
Thus there is a need for further investigation into the GA/LA interaction in the mental 
representation of events. The current research examines how GA and LA interact to influence the 
ease of imagining events. The findings will provide insight into the processing of temporal 
information in sentences and to further elucidate the manner in which time is represented during 
event imagination. 
Slow cortical potentials in language processing 
Slow Cortical Potentials (SCPs) are EEG-recorded amplitudes recorded from the scalp. 
These amplitudes have a relatively long duration, lasting from a few hundred milliseconds to a 
number of minutes. A number of studies have found SCP amplitudes to indicate levels of 
cognitive effort associated with language processing (e.g., Ferretti et al., 2007; King & Kutas, 
1998). 
Münte, Schiltz, and Kutas (1998) investigated the processing of sentences that describe 
sequentially occurring events. Specifically, this experiment was concerned with two types of 
sentences that contain temporal modifiers; examples of which are below: 
(1) After the scientist submitted the paper, the journal changed its policy. 
(2) Before the scientist submitted the paper, the journal changed its policy. 
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Each of these two example sentences describes two sequential events. The first example 
contains the modifier “after” which retains the natural temporal order of the two described 
events, whereas the second example uses the modifier “before” which disrupts the natural 
temporal order of the two events. 
Münte et al. (1998) used EEG to investigate how disrupting the natural temporal order of 
events affects sentence processing. Amplitudes were recorded during the reading of sentences, 
similar in structure to those in the given examples (1, 2), which similarly began with the word 
‘After’ or ‘Before’. Participants were also given a sentence span task, to test their working 
memory capacities. Results indicated that EEG-recorded SCP negativity was greater for ‘Before’ 
sentences than for ‘After’ sentences. It was also found that the difference in negativity, according 
to sentences type, was positively correlated with working memory capacity. These results show 
that people use real world information combined with sentence descriptions of temporal 
structures to process event information. It is expected that people make use of the real-world, 
temporal knowledge given by LA, in a similar manner. 
King and Kutas (1995) used ERP methodology to investigate how the processing of 
subject- (1) and object-relative (2) sentences is influenced by readers’ working memory 
capacities.  
(1) The reporter who harshly attacked the senator admitted the error. 
(2) The reporter who the senator harshly attacked admitted the error. 
SCP amplitudes were recorded while participants read sentences. Additionally, 
participants were tested on their comprehension of the sentences previously read. Based on 
comprehension test results, participants were classified either as ‘Poor Comprehenders’ or ‘Good 
Comprehenders’. Across all participants, it was found that SCP amplitudes were more negative 
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for object-relative sentences than for subject-relative sentences. This negativity and sentence-
type-based difference in amplitude was found to be greater for Good Comprehenders than for 
Poor Comprehenders. Based on these results, the researchers concluded that the observed SCP 
amplitudes could be seen as indexing the difficulty of sentence processing, with greater 
negativity in SCP amplitudes indicating greater processing difficulty.  
SCP methodology has also been used by Conway, Pleydell-Pearce, and Whitecross 
(2001) to investigate the electrophysiological correlates of autobiographical memory retrieval. 
Participants in this study retrieved autobiographical memories in response to noun cues from 
three categories: common objects (e.g., chair), common locations (e.g., restaurant), and emotions 
(e.g., happy). Upon viewing a cue, each participant retrieved a related, autobiographical memory, 
and indicated by a lever pull that they had successfully done so. After memory retrieval, 
participants held their memories in mind for 5 seconds and then actively released the memory 
from mind over the following 5 seconds. Participants also recorded ratings on their retrieved 
memories regarding memory vividness, importance, emotionality, and how frequently the 
memory had been rehearsed. 
Based on the SCP results, Conway et al. (2001) concluded that autobiographical memory 
retrieval is associated with a pattern of activation beginning in left-frontal networks and moving 
to right-posterior networks. This left-frontal activation was interpreted as being associated with 
memory retrieval, while the later, right-posterior activation was associated with holding a 
memory in mind. It was also noted, based on behavioural results, that memories were 
predominantly visual in nature. Lastly, it was found that, during early retrieval, memories based 
on emotion cues were associated with the most SCP negativity while those based on object cues 
were associated with the least. In the later “hold-in-mind” phase, however, memories based on 
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emotion cues were found to elicit the greatest negativity of all cue types. This increased 
negativity was concluded to be associated with greater recruitment of cognitive resources. 
Neurophysiology of imagined events 
Further ERP research by Conway and colleagues has investigated the similarities and 
differences in the electrophysiological correlates of imagining events and retrieving events from 
AM (Conway et al., 2001; Conway, Pleydell-Pearce, Whitecross, & Sharpe, 2003). This 
research, and the fMRI research discussed below, converge to show that in general the same 
brain regions are recruited for AM retrieval and imagining events, although to different degrees. 
Using methodology similar to that of Conway et al. (2001), Conway et al. (2003) 
examined the neurophysiological similarities between the processes of autobiographical memory 
recall and event imagining. Participants generated and held in mind AMs and imagined events 
that were elicited to noun cues that described common objects and generic locations. The 
researchers examined how SCPs changed while people generated and held these event 
representations in mind. Conway et al.’s (2003) findings showed that in the event generation 
phase, SCPs were more negative over left frontal regions for both AM and imagined event 
representations (Dwivedi et al., 2006). This negativity over the left frontal regions is thought to 
capture cognitive mechanisms that are necessary for constructing event representations. Another 
key finding was that during the generation phase, SCPs became more negative over posterior 
occipital regions, and that this negativity was greater for AM representations. The authors 
suggest that these differences at posterior occipital regions reflect differences in the content of 
the forms of event representation, with AMs more likely to invoke the activation of 
sensory/perceptual knowledge than imagined events. Note that the methodology employed in the 
current study is based on that of Conway et al. (2001; 2003), in that it also involves participants 
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generating events in response to textual stimuli. This methodological similarity allows for the 
discussion, later in this document, of interpretations of the current study’s results, based on 
Conway et al.’s (2003) interpretations of differences in SCP topography associated with event 
representation. 
Addis, Wong, and Schacter (2007) employed a functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI) paradigm in order to identify and contrast the neural substrates of recalling past events 
with those of imagining plausible future events. Participants were cued with various nouns as 
well as instructions either to recall or to imagine a noun-related event. In response to each cue, 
participants were to construct the event in their minds (construction phase), indicate via button 
press that they had done so, and then continue to elaborate on the event in mind (elaboration 
phase). Participants were also cued with descriptions of the timeframes for events (e.g., last 
week, last year, next year, etc.) and told to imagine events from the first-person perspective. A 
semantic retrieval task and a visual imagery task were interspersed between trials to act as 
control tasks. 
The researchers concluded that the right frontopolar cortex has a role in prospective 
thinking and that the left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex is involved in the process of event 
generation. The right hippocampus was determined to be associated with the process of future 
event imagination, as it was uniquely activated during this process. Both processes were also 
found to activate areas that constitute the autobiographical memory retrieval network. 
Another fMRI study conducted by Hassabis, Kumaran, and Maguire (2007) similarly 
investigated the neural correlates of event recall and event imagination. This research attempted 
to more finely identify the neural correlates of complex episodic recollection and imagination by 
contrasting activation for retrieval/generation of complex scenes with that for simple objects. In 
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order to accomplish this, the researchers had participants form memories and imagine scenes and 
objects prior to the actual scanning procedure. During pre-scan interviews, participants 
completed four tasks:  
1. Remember a set of common objects, based on pictures of those objects. 
2. Visualize and remember a set of common objects, based on verbal descriptions of 
 those objects. 
3. Imagine scenes, based on verbal descriptions of locations. 
4. Recall recent, episodic memories. 
During the scanning sessions to follow, participants formed mental representations, based 
on cues, while undergoing fMRI scanning. Specifically, participants retrieved representations of 
the objects, locations, and episodic memories that had been recalled or created during the pre-
scan interview. Additionally, participants were to imagine new fictitious scenes and objects. 
These tasks allowed for the comparison of object representation and scene representation in 
order to isolate those neural components distinctly recruited by the process of scene 
representation. Representations for imagined scenes could then be contrasted with those of 
episodic memories. The results showed that both episodic memory retrieval and the construction 
of new fictitious scenes recruited the hippocampus, parahippocampal gyrus, retrosplenial 
cortices, posterior parietal cortices, and ventromedial prefrontal cortex. Additionally, activation 
occurred in the anterior medial prefrontal cortex, the posterior cingulate cortex, and the 
precuneus, only during the process of episodic memory retrieval. It was concluded that these 
regions may be involved in the representation of self-related processes and in mental time travel. 
Experiment 1 
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The current study employed an imagination task similar to that used by Conway et al. 
(2003) to investigate the electrophysiological differences associated with processing GA and LA 
in verb phrases while people imagine events. Relatively little is known about how GA and LA 
influence event representations and, therefore, the main goal was to contribute to this limited, but 
important, literature by examining the influence of GA and LA in terms of both the ease of 
imagining events and qualitative differences in event representation. This research aimed to 
determine how temporal information is represented in the brain during the process of event 
imagination. The investigation of how these factors influence invent imagination is crucial to the 
understanding of sentence processing, discourse processing, the representation of time during 
event imagination, and the development of experimental paradigms that use verbal cues. 
In the present study, participants read short sentences (e.g., I was building) that always 
begin with the pronoun “I” and contain an imperfective or perfective verb that is either an 
activity or an accomplishment. EEG amplitudes were recorded for later SCP analysis while 
participants imagined themselves participating in the described events for 8 seconds. Behavioural 
measures were also employed to investigate the influence of GA and LA on ratings of sensory 
vividness as well as vividness of people, objects, and locations. Other crucial event properties 
investigated include the perspective of the imagined events (first versus third person), the 
temporal component of the events imagined (beginning, middle, end), the rated importance and 
duration of the events in the real world, and the number of people and objects present in the 
events. Based on the previous GA research discussed above, we expect that in general the 
behavioural measures should show evidence that the imperfective aspect highlights properties of 
events that are consistent with the ongoing nature of those events, whereas the perfective phrases 
should highlight properties consistent with the completion of those events. 
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Our predictions about SCP amplitudes and the ease of imagining the events are based on 
the previous GA and LA findings with a sentence-picture matching paradigm (Yap et al., 2009). 
If Yap et al.’s findings extend to when people simply imagine events, then forcing people to 
imagine Activities (which do not have natural endpoints) as completed (perfective) should cause 
greater negative SCP amplitudes than when the same events are ongoing (imperfective). 
Conversely, forcing people to imagine Accomplishments (which do have natural endpoints) as 
ongoing, should cause SCP amplitudes to be more negative than when those same events are 
imagined as completed (see Table 4 for a tabular representation of predicted results). 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 50 (29 female) students from Wilfrid Laurier University, ranging in age 
from 18-21 years. All participants were right-handed native English speakers. Participants were 
granted course credit for their participation. 
Materials 
The experimental stimuli consisted of 46 activity verbs and 46 accomplishment verbs 
(see Appendix A, Tables 1 & 2). A Google frequency search was conducted to ensure that the 
activity and accomplishment verbs used did not differ in commonality across their aspectual 
forms. A GA (imperfective vs. perfective) X LA ANOVA was conducted on the collected 
frequencies. Verb stimuli were not found to differ based on GA, F(1,180) = 1.271, p = .261, LA, 
F(1,180) = 1.061, p = .304, and there was no GA X LA interaction, F(1,180) = .390, p = .533. 
These verbs were presented in short phrases that always began with the pronoun “I”. Half of the 
phrases were presented in the imperfective form (e.g., I was skating) and the other half presented 
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in the perfective form (e.g., I skated). Thus, there were 4 conditions presented in the form of the 
following examples: 
 
Imperfective Accomplishment: I was building 
Perfective Accomplishment: I built 
Imperfective Activity: I was acting 
Perfective Activity: I acted 
 
Two experimental lists were created such that each participant saw each verb only once 
and received 23 trials in each of the 4 conditions. Across the 2 lists, each verb appeared in both 
its imperfective and perfective form. Each list also contained 2 additional trials at the beginning 
that served as practice trials. 
A booklet (see Appendix A, Figure 1) was also provided to each participant that 
consisted of a set of questions that were to be answered following each trial. These questions 
included 1) the perspective of the imagined event; from my eyes (first person) / looking at self 
(third person), 2) sensory vividness (sight, touch, taste, smell, sound) on a 1-7 scale (1 = not at 
all, 7 = very), 3) vividness of people, objects, and locations on a 1-7 scale (1 = not at all, 7 = 
very), 4) the temporal component of the events imagined (beginning, middle, end), 5) the number 
of people and objects present in the imagined event, 6) the estimation of the duration of the 
imagined events in the real world, and 7) the importance of the imagined events in the real world 
(1 = not at all, 7 = very). 
Procedure 
TIME, PERSPECTIVES, VERBS, AND IMAGINING EVENTS 28 
 
Participants were seated in an electrically shielded room facing a monitor and a push-
button switch. Participants were then outfitted with an EEG cap. Following capping, participants 
were instructed to imagine themselves participating in the described action that appears on the 
screen. It was emphasized that the imagined action should not simply be a memory. On each trial 
the stimulus presentation began with a “Ready?” prompt, to which participants responded by 
pressing a button to begin the trial. Following this prompt, a fixation, “XXXX”, was presented in 
the centre of the screen for 5000 ms. Participants were instructed to focus on this fixation. The 
fixation was followed by a stimulus phrase with either the first (perfective condition) or first two 
words (imperfective condition) presented one at a time in the centre of the screen. These words 
were always presented for 300 ms and then followed by 200 ms of blank screen). The last word 
in the phrase (i.e., verbing/verbed) remained on the screen for 8 seconds. After the verb was on 
the screen for 8 seconds, it was replaced by the instruction, “Record answers now” (see Figure 2 
for a sample trial). Participants then completed the behavioural questionnaire regarding the 
properties of the preceding imagined event. 
EEG Recording 
The electroencephalograph (EEG) was recorded via a cap that contained 64 Ag/AgCl 
electrodes distributed evenly across the scalp (10-20 layout). Electrodes were placed on the left 
infra and supra orbital ridge of each participant as well as the outer canthii. EEG was processed 
through a Neuroscan Synamps2 amplifier, set at a bandpass of 0.05-100 Hz and digitized at 250 
Hz. Electrical impedance was kept below 5 KΩ. 
Results 
EEG Results 
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The raw data was re-referenced off-line to the average of the left and right mastoids. A 
low-pass filter set at 30 Hz was applied to remove high frequency noise. Trials contaminated by 
artifacts (blinks, excessive muscle artifact, etc.) were removed before averaging. ERP averages 
were then created for each participant that spanned 200 ms before the onset of the verbs in each 
phrase to 6 seconds following the verbs.1 For analysis purposes, the averages for all participants 
were separated into 500 ms time segments for the first 3 seconds following the onset of the verbs 
in the phrases, and then separated into 1000 ms segments for the remaining 3 seconds of the 
imagining period. The shorter time measurements for the first half of the imagination periods 
allowed examination of changes in amplitudes that reflect the transition from comprehending the 
phrases to actively trying to imagine the events over the six second period. 
The mean amplitudes for each temporal region were then subjected to a GA (imperfective 
vs. perfective) X LA (activities vs. accomplishments) X Anteriority (prefrontal vs. frontal vs. 
central vs. parietal vs. occipital) X Hemisphere (left vs. right) X List (1 vs. 2) ANOVA. The 
electrodes that comprised the topographical variables included FP1, FP2, F3, F4, C3, C4, P3, P4, 
CB1, CB2. All variables except for List were within-participant variables. Note that 
topographical effects are only reported below if they interacted with GA and/or LA because 
those are the topographical interactions of main theoretical interest. All p-values are reported 
after Epsilon correction (Huynh-Felt) for repeated measures with greater than one degree of 
freedom. See Appendix C, Tables 5-7 and Figures 6-14, for ANOVA results and graphical 
representations of SCP amplitudes. 
                                                
1 Note that participants were required to imagine the events for 8 seconds, which is a long 
time to not move or blink relative to other ERP studies. As a result, we only analyzed up to 6 
seconds because of the increase in artifacts toward the end of the trials. Only trials that were 
completely free of artifacts for 6 seconds following the onset of the verbs were included in the 
analysis (74% of all trials).  
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0-500 ms time region. The two-way interaction between GA and LA was significant, 
F(1,48) = 5.13, p < .03. This interaction occurred because, for accomplishment phrases, mean 
amplitudes were more negative when they were in imperfective (M = -.31 µV) than perfective 
form (M = .60), F(1,48) = 4.36, p < .05. Alternatively, for activity phrases, mean amplitudes 
were more negative when they were in perfective (M = .07 µV) than imperfective form (M = .55 
µV). However this latter comparison did not reach statistical significance (p > .26). 
There also was a robust GA by Anteriority interaction, F(4,192) = 15.26, p < .001. In 
frontal and prefrontal regions, respectively, amplitudes were more negative for imperfective than 
for perfective phrases, F(1,192) = 34.91, p < .001, F(1,192) = 34.79, p < .001. Alternatively, in 
the central, parietal, and occipital regions, amplitudes were more negative for perfective than for 
imperfective phrases, although this difference in GA only reached significance in the occipital 
region (occipital: F(1,192) = 5.22, p < .05; parietal: F(1,192) = 4.60, p = .06; central: F(1,192) = 
1.63, p > .17. No other effects of interest were marginal or significant. 
500-1000 ms time region. The interaction between GA and LA was significant, F(1,48) = 
4.90, p < .04. Amplitudes were more negative for imperfective (M = 1.65 µV) than perfective 
accomplishment phrases (M = 2.62 µV), F(1,48) = 2.19, p > .14. Alternatively, amplitudes were 
more negative for perfective (M = 2.41 µV) than imperfective activity phrases (M = 3.51 µV), 
F(1,48) = 2.72, p < .11. 
The GA by Anteriority interaction was also significant, F(4,192) = 8.12, p < .001. 
Amplitudes were more negative for imperfective than for perfective phrases at prefrontal, 
F(1,192) = 11.51, p < .01, and frontal scalp locations, F(1,192) = 3.45, p < .09. Alternatively, in 
the central, parietal, and occipital regions, amplitudes were more negative for perfective than for 
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imperfective phrases (occipital: F(1,192) = 8.76, p < .02; parietal: F(1,192) = 7.50, p = .03; 
central: F(1,192) = 1.90, p > .16). 
Finally, there was a main effect of LA, which occurred because mean amplitudes were 
more positive for activity (M = 2.96 µV) than accomplishment phrases (M = 2.14 µV), F(1,48) = 
4.07, p < .05. No other effects of interest were marginal or significant. 
1000-1500 ms time region. The LA and GA interaction was significant, F(1,48) = 6.76, p 
< .02. Similar to the preceding time regions, this interaction occurred because mean amplitudes 
were more negative for perfective (M = 2.44 µV) than imperfective activity phrases (M = 4.50 
µV), F(1,48) = 5.49, p < .03. Alternatively, amplitudes were more negative for imperfective (M 
= 2.31 µV) than perfective accomplishment phrases (M = 3.49 µV), although this effect did not 
reach significance, F(1,48) = 1.78, p > .18. 
GA and Anteriority also interacted, F(4,192) =  10.23, p < .001. At prefrontal locations, 
amplitudes were more negative for imperfective than perfective phrases, F(1,192) = 5.35, p < 
.05. Alternatively, amplitudes were more negative for perfective than imperfective phrases at all 
other head locations, and these differences reached significance at all regions except frontal 
(occipital: F(1,192) = 20.69, p < .001; parietal: F(1,192) = 23.82, p < .001; central: F(1,192) = 
20.73, p < .001; frontal: F<1). No other effects of interest were marginal or significant. 
1500-2000 ms time region. The interaction between LA and GA was significant, F(1,48) 
= 6.14, p < .02. Mean amplitudes were more negative for perfective (M = 2.10 µV) than 
imperfective activity phrases (M = 4.31 µV), F(1,48) = 5.15, p < .03. In contrast, amplitudes 
were more negative for imperfective (M = 2.21 µV) than perfective accomplishment phrases (M 
= 3.41 µV), although this difference did not reach significance, F(1,48) = 1.53, p > .22. 
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The interaction between GA and Anteriority continued to be significant in this temporal 
region, F(4,192) =  4.85, p < .02. At prefrontal locations, amplitudes were now nonsignificantly 
more negative for imperfective than perfective phrases, F < 1.05. Amplitudes at all other head 
locations were more negative for perfective than imperfective phrases, and once again these 
differences reached significance at all regions except the frontal region (occipital: F(1,192) = 
11.80, p < .01; parietal: F(1,192) = 16.24, p < .01; central: F(1,192) = 14.92, p < .01; frontal: F < 
1.06). No other effects of interest were marginal or significant. 
2000-2500 ms time region. GA and LA continued to interact in this region, F(1,48) = 
7.41, p < .01. Mean amplitudes were more negative for perfective (M = 1.69 µV) than 
imperfective activity phrases (M = 4.26 µV), F(1,48) = 6.00, p < .02. For accomplishment 
phrases, amplitudes were more negative for imperfective (M = 1.87 µV) than perfective phrases 
(M = 3.34 µV), F(1,48) = 1.96, p > .16. 
The GA by Anteriority interaction was marginally significant, F(4,192) = 2.52, p < .09. 
The form of this interaction was identical to the previous temporal region; at prefrontal locations, 
amplitudes were nonsignificantly more negative for imperfective than perfective phrases, F < 1, 
whereas amplitudes at all other head locations were more negative for perfective than 
imperfective phrases, and these differences reached significance at all regions except the frontal 
region (occipital: F(1,192) = 8.09, p < .02; parietal: F(1,192) = 12.54, p < .01; central: F(1,192) 
= 10.95, p < .01; frontal: F(1,192) = 1.91, p > .16). No other effects of interest were marginal or 
significant. 
2500-3000 ms time region. The GA by LA interaction was marginally significant, 
F(1,48) = 3.90, p < .06. Amplitudes were more negative for perfective (M = 1.82 µV) than 
imperfective activity phrases (M = 2.94 µV), F(1,48) = 6.00, p < .02. For accomplishment 
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phrases, amplitudes were more negative for imperfective (M = 1.29 µV) than perfective phrases 
(M = 2.77 µV), F(1,48) = 2.5, p > .12. 
The GA by Anteriority interaction was also marginally significant, F(4,192) = 2.69, p < 
.07. Amplitudes were more negative for imperfective than perfective phrases at prefrontal, 
frontal, and central regions, although these differences only reached significance at prefrontal 
regions (prefrontal: F(1,192) = 7.97, p < .02, frontal: F < 1.53, central; F < 1). Amplitudes at 
parietal and occipital regions were more negative for perfective than imperfective phrases, 
although these differences were not significant for either region (occipital: F < 1; parietal: F < 
1.61). No other effects of interest were marginal or significant. 
3000-4000 ms time region. GA and LA marginally interacted in this temporal region, 
F(1,48) = 2.90, p < .10. Amplitudes were more negative for perfective (M = .71 µV) than 
imperfective activities (M = 2.14 µV), and were more negative for imperfective (M = .38 µV) 
than perfective (M = 1.88 µV) accomplishments, although neither of these comparisons reached 
significance (activities: F < 1.38, accomplishments: F < 1.52). 
GA and Anteriority also marginally interacted, F(4,192) = 2.49, p < .09. Amplitudes were 
more negative for imperfective than perfective phrases at prefrontal and frontal regions, although 
this difference only reached significance at prefrontal regions (prefrontal: F(1,192) = 6.24, p < 
.04, frontal: F < 1). Amplitudes at central, parietal and occipital regions were more negative for 
perfective than imperfective phrases, although these differences were not significant at any of 
these regions (occipital: F < 1; parietal: F(1,192) = 2.44, p > .12; central: F < 1). No other effects 
of interest were marginal or significant. 
4000-5000 ms time region. The GA by Anteriority interaction was the only effect of 
interest in this region that approached significance, F(4, 192) = 2.34, p < .10. Amplitudes were 
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more negative for imperfective than perfective phrases at prefrontal and frontal regions 
(prefrontal: F(1,192) = 15.96, p < .01, frontal: F(1,192) = 6.69, p < .03). Alternatively, 
amplitudes at central, parietal and occipital regions were slightly more negative for perfective 
than imperfective phrases (occipital: F < 1; parietal: F < 1; central: F(1,192) = 1.88, p > .16). 
5000-6000 ms time region. The GA by Anteriority interaction was significant, F(4, 192) 
= 3.04, p < .05. Amplitudes were more negative for imperfective than perfective phrases at all 
topographical regions, although the difference was largest at prefrontal, frontal, and central 
regions (prefrontal: F(1,192) = 39.06, p < .001, frontal: F(1,192) = 29.42, p < .001; central: 
F(1,192) = 17.43, p < .001; parietal: F(1,192) = 3.82, p < .08; occipital: F(1,192) = 9.03, p < 
.02). No other effects of interest were marginal or significant. 
Behavioural Results 
The means per condition for each participant on the behavioural measures were subjected 
to a 2 Grammatical Aspect (GA: imperfective vs. perfective) X 2 Lexical Aspect (LA: activities 
vs. accomplishments) X 2 Participant List (list 1 vs. list 2) ANOVA. GA and LA were within-
participants variables, whereas List was between participants. See Appendix C, Tables 8 and 9, 
for a list of the overall means for the different conditions for each of the questions answered and 
the associated F-values. 
Perspective. The GA by LA interaction was not significant (F<1). However, activity 
phrases were found more often than accomplishment phrases to evoke the first-person 
perspective, F(1,48) = 27.33, p < .001. The main effect of GA was also marginally significant, 
and this occurred because people imagined events slightly more often in first person perspective 
with perfective than imperfective aspect, F(1,48) = 3.21, p < .08. This effect was largely driven 
from the larger difference in first person perspective for perfective than imperfective 
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accomplishment phrases, F(1,48) = 6.20, p < .02. The percentage of events imagined in first 
person perspective did not vary as a function of GA for activity phrases, F(1,48) = 1.34, p > .25. 
Event Vividness. Accomplishment phrases evoked greater sensory vividness than activity 
phrases, for sight, F(1,48) = 15.20, p < .001, sound, F(1,48) = 50.89, p < .001, and taste, F(1,48) 
= 4.56, p < .04. Alternatively, activity phrases evoked greater sensory vividness than 
accomplishment phrases for touch, F(1,48) = 28.88, p < .001. LA had no influence on smell 
vividness, F < 1. All GA main effects and GA by LA interactions were not significant for 
sensory vividness. 
Accomplishment phrases led to more vivid imagining of the people featured in an event 
than did activity phrases, F(1,48) = 66.50, p < .001. Although the GA by LA interaction did not 
reach significance, F(1,48) = 2.19, p > .14, planned comparisons revealed that imagined people 
were more vivid for imperfective than perfective activities, F(1,48) = 5.48, p < .03. 
Alternatively, GA had no influence on people vividness for accomplishment phrases, F < 1. The 
main effect of GA was marginally significant, and this occurred because imagined people were 
more vivid in general for imperfective than perfective phrases, F(1,48) = 3.18, p = .08. 
Accomplishment phrases also led to more vivid imagining of the event locations than did 
activity phrases, F(1,48) = 40.03, p < .001. The main effect of GA was not significant, F < 1. 
However, the GA by LA interaction was marginally significant, F(1,48) = 3.26, p < .08. This 
effect occurred because imagined event locations were marginally more vivid for imperfective 
than perfective activities, F(1,48) = 2.83, p < .10, whereas the difference in imagined event 
vividness did not approach significance for accomplishments, F < 1. 
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Activity phrases led to more vivid imagining of event objects than did accomplishment 
phrases, F(1,48) = 44.10, p < .001. All other effects for object vividness did not approach 
significance (all Fs < 1.34). 
Imagined Temporal Components of Events (beginning, middle, end). The ANOVA 
conducted for this behavioural measure was identical to the ANOVAs described above with the 
exception that the present ANOVA included the variable Temporal Component (beginning 
versus middle versus end), which was a within participant variable. This analysis demonstrated 
that when participants imagined events they tended to imagine the middle temporal component 
of those events with the most frequency (82%), followed by the beginning (38%) and then the 
end component (25%), F(2,48) = 100.94, p < .001. Participants also tended to imagine more of 
the different temporal components in general for perfective (49%) than imperfective aspect 
(47%), F(1,48) = 6.17, p < .02. The main effect of LA was not significant, F < 1. 
The interaction between Temporal Component and GA was significant, F(2,48) = 8.25, p 
< .001. This interaction occurred because people imagined the end component of events more 
frequently for perfective (29%) than for imperfective phrases (21%), F(1,48) = 17.65, p < .001, 
whereas no differences were found for GA for the middle component (imperfective = 83%, 
perfective 80%), F < 1.41, or beginning component (imperfective = 38%, perfective 37%), F < 1. 
The interaction between Temporal Component and LA was also significant, F(2,48) = 
4.69, p < .02. This interaction occurred because people imagined the end component of events 
more frequently for activities (27%) than for accomplishments (23%), F(1,48) = 5.70, p < .02, 
whereas no differences were found for LA for the middle component (activities = 80%, 
accomplishments = 83%), F(1,48) = 2.46, p > .12, or beginning component (activities = 37%, 
accomplishments = 38%), F < 1.25. 
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Although the interaction between Temporal Component, GA, and LA was not significant 
(F < 1.24), planned comparisons demonstrated that people imagined the middle component more 
often for imperfective activity phrases than for the same phrases in perfective form, F(1,96) = 
4.20, p < .05. Alternatively, for accomplishment phrases there were no differences in GA for the 
middle component. For both activities and accomplishments, people imagined the end 
component more often when phrases were in perfective than imperfective form (activities: 
F(1,96) = 22.47, p < .001; accomplishments: F(1,96) = 11.56, p < .01). There were no significant 
differences between GA and LA for the beginning component (all Fs < 1). 
Number of people and objects in imagined events. The ANOVA for the number of people 
imagined demonstrated a robust main effect of LA, F(1,48) = 23.83, p < .001. This effect 
occurred because people imagined more people for accomplishment (9.8) than activity (4.3) 
phrases. No other effects approached significance for the number of people imagined (all Fs < 
1). 
The ANOVA for the number of objects imagined demonstrated a marginal main effect of 
GA, F(1,48) = 2.97, p = .09. This marginal effect occurred because people imagined more 
objects for perfective (9.0) than imperfective (7.0) phrases. Planned comparisons revealed that 
this difference approached significance for Activity phrases, F(1,48) = 3.70, p = .06, but not for 
Accomplishment phrases, F < 1. No other effects approached significance (all F’s < 1). 
Estimation of event duration and importance in real world. Activities (M = 33.77 
minutes) were estimated to have a longer duration in the real world than accomplishments (M = 
14.52 minutes), F(1,48) = 4.46, p < .04. GA did not have a significant influence on estimated 
event durations, F < 1.46, and the GA x LA interaction was also not significant, F < 1. Planned 
comparisons showed that GA had no influence for accomplishments, F < 1. Alternatively, 
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perfective activities tended to be estimated as longer in duration than imperfective activities, 
although this difference did not reach significance, F(1,48) = 2.67, p < .11. 
Participants rated accomplishments (M = 3.52) as more important events in the real world 
than activities (M = 2.89), F(1,48) = 80.99, p < .001. No other effects were significant or 
marginally significant for importance estimations (All Fs < 1.17). 
Discussion 
GA/LA SCP Results 
The results of the SCP analyses revealed that LA and GA interacted. Amplitudes were 
more negative when phrases contained perfective activities relative to imperfective activities 
throughout the first 6 seconds of the imagination period. Alternatively, over the same period 
amplitudes were more negative for imperfective accomplishments than perfective 
accomplishments. This crossover interaction reached significance or was marginally significant 
up to 4 seconds into the imagination period. These results show that imagining events without 
natural endpoints (activities) as completed, or imagining events with natural endpoints 
(accomplishments) as ongoing, is more difficult than when the same events are reference as 
ongoing or completed, respectively. 
It is important to note that the GA by LA interaction began within 500 ms of the onset of 
the verbs, which is likely to be a period that still captures comprehension of the phrases in 
general. Later time frames are less likely to capture comprehension per se and more likely to 
reflect the participants actively trying to imagine the described events. In this regard, our 
findings show that GA and LA had a similar influence on the electrophysiological correlates 
associated with comprehending and imagining the events described in the phrases. It is possible, 
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however, that the task demand of actively imagining the events is leading to the similarities in 
the results between the early and later time frames. 
The results of the current research extend recent research that manipulated GA and LA 
and demonstrated a similar interaction to that shown by Yap et al. (2009). Recall that this study 
employed a picture-matching task and used matching latencies as a measure of cognitive effort. 
As in the current study, Yap et al. (2009) investigated the interaction between GA and LA. In 
both this study and the current study, GA and LA were found to interact in a similar manner. The 
results of both studies point to the conclusion that activities require more effort to represent in 
the perfective than in the imperfective form and that accomplishments require more effort to 
represent in the imperfective than in the perfective form. 
Behavioural Results 
For both vividness of location and vividness of people, participants gave higher ratings 
based on activity stimuli than based on accomplishment stimuli. Further, vividness ratings on 
these event features were higher based on imperfective-activity stimuli, as compared to 
perfective activity stimuli. These results indicate that participants represent these factors with a 
greater degree of vividness when they represent events as being ongoing. Further, this indicates 
that both people and locations are more accessible in event representations based on activity 
verbs, as opposed to those based on accomplishment verbs. 
As expected, the middle component of events was imagined with greater frequency based 
on activities than based on accomplishments. This component was also imagined more 
frequently based on imperfective-activity verbs than based on perfective-activity verbs. This 
result is consistent with previous literature that has found the imperfective and activity verbs to 
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be associated with a focus on the ongoing stage of events (Madden & Zwaan, 2003; Yap et al., 
2009). 
Perfective stimuli were found more often than imperfective stimuli to lead to 
representations of an event’s end. This result is consistent with the idea that perfective stimuli 
place focus on the endpoints of events (Madden & Zwaan, 2003). Unexpectedly, participants 
represented the end of events more often following activity stimuli than following 
accomplishment stimuli. 
Imagined Events and Visual Perspective 
Regardless of event cue, participants were most likely to represent events from the first-
person perspective than from the third-person perspective. However, the frequency of first-
person perspective usage was unexpectedly influenced by the GA/LA interaction. This pattern of 
perspective usage seems to be distinct or partially distinct from the observed pattern of GA/LA-
based differences in SCP negativity. Thus, there does not appear to exist a simple relationship 
between the tendency to represent an event from a certain perspective and the cognitive effort 
associated with event representation. Rather, representation from the first-person perspective 
seems to occur more for activities than it does for accomplishments. It was also found that use of 
the first-person perspective occurred more spontaneously for accomplishments when they were 
in perfective than imperfective form.  
Experiment 2 
Based on the finding that perspective recruitment differs markedly based on the GA and 
LA of imagined-event cues, Experiment 2 was conducted to determine how imagined events are 
constrained by explicit instructions to adopt either a first or third person perspective. This 
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experiment is introduced by an overview of previous literature on differences between forms of 
visual perspective. This overview is followed by a description of Experiment 2. 
Nigro and Neisser (1983) conducted a number of the first studies aimed at investigating 
differences in people’s tendencies to represent recalled events from the first-person or the third-
person perspective. Participants were cued with sentence-long descriptions of familiar events and 
asked to recall specific events from the past in response. Participants then rated events on various 
dimensions: emotionality, self-awareness, recency, vividness, and ability to recall each memory. 
Crucially, they also indicated whether they perceived events from the first-person perspective, 
the third-person perspective, both perspectives, or neither perspective. Results from these ratings 
indicate that participants were more likely to adopt the third-person perspective than the first-
person perspective for memories associated with high ratings of emotionality and self-awareness. 
First-person memories were also found to have taken place more recently and to be more vivid 
than third-person memories.  
In a separate manipulation, Nigro and Neisser (1983) had participants complete a similar 
task, but were asked to focus on the feelings associated with an event or the event’s 
concrete/objective features. A third group of participants, told simply to describe the event, acted 
as a control. Their results showed that participants were more likely to adopt the first-person than 
third-person perspective when asked to focus on their feelings during recall. When asked to 
focus on the concrete/objective features during recall, participants more often used the third-
person than in the group asked to focus on their feelings during recall. Overall, the first-person 
perspective was used more often than the third-person perspective. Collectively, Nigro and 
Neisser’s (1983) findings represent a key investigation into the multitude of factors that 
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influence visual perspective recruitment. It is clear from this research that subtle changes in 
stimulus content can be greatly influential on the perspective used in event representation. 
Previous research has investigated the neural correlates of first-person and third-person 
perspective event representation. For example, Eich, Nelson, Leghari, and Handy (2009) 
conducted an fMRI investigation into the differences in neural activation associated with the 
usage of different perspectives in event recall. Participants in the study engaged in a series of 
complex physical tasks one week prior to an fMRI scanning session. During fMRI scanning, 
participants recalled each event two times: Once from the first-person or the third-person 
perspective and again from either that same perspective or the previously unused perspective. 
During the scanning procedure, participants also engaged in a visual search task, which served as 
a control task. Following the recollection of each event, participants gave verbal reports of the 
event they recalled and rated that event on emotionality, as well as indicating how successful 
they were at using and maintaining the perspective they were instructed to use.  
Event recall from both the first-person and third-person perspectives was associated with 
activation in the prefrontal cortex, medial temporal cortex, inferior parietal lobule, precuneus, 
bilateral insula, left somatosensory areas, right posterior, and dorsal amygdala. Relative to the 
control task, recall from the first-person perspective was associated with increased activation in 
the right posterior amygdala. In contrast, third-person perspective recall was associated with 
diminished activation in the bilateral insula. In the left hemisphere, activation in the 
somatosensory area, motor strip, sensory strip, and lateral occipital complex was diminished for 
first-person recall, relative to the control task, and further diminished for third-person recall.  
Research on perspective has also examined the manner in which the adoption of different 
perspectives affects appraisals of physical sensation and social perceptions. For example, 
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Macrae, Raj, Best, Christian, and Miles (2012) investigated the role played by differences in 
perspective on appraisals of social warmth. In order to investigate this relationship, the 
researchers developed a paradigm in which participants imagined an interaction with a friend, in 
which that friend has them hold his/her coffee, which is described as either hot or iced. Crucially, 
participants imagined this interaction as occurring from either the first-person or the third-person 
perspective. Following the imagining of an interaction, participants completed a questionnaire in 
which they rated their appraisals of the imagined friend on a cold-warm scale (psychological 
warmth). As a control, additional trials were conducted in which no temperature was associated 
with the coffee cup.  
For the interactions imagined from the third-person perspective, it was found that coffee 
cup temperature had no influence on participants’ evaluations of psychological warmth. 
However, when participants imagined interactions from the first-person perspective their 
evaluations of the friend’s psychological warmth were influenced by the temperature of the 
coffee such that the friend was rated as colder while participants imagined holding an iced coffee 
as compared to a hot coffee and the control task. It is clear from these findings that participants 
were impaired at detecting changes in temperature when imagining themselves coming into 
contact with a cold/warm object from an external perspective. From the first-person perspective, 
however, participants were able to make such judgments. This result indicates that he first-
person perspective enhances sensitivity to sensory information, which can impact the process of 
making social judgments. 
Experiment 2 was designed to extend previous research on perspective taking by 
determining the roles of visual perspective in constraining the representation of imagined 
activities. Recall that one of the key findings of people’s perspective taking in Experiment 1 was 
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that people employed the first person perspective significantly more often than third person 
perspective for activities, and that this result was found for both imperfective and perfective 
aspect. This suggests that when people imagine dynamic events that do not have natural 
endpoints they tend to imagine them as if they are experiencing them directly (i.e., an embodied 
perspective). If people naturally use the first person perspective more frequently for activities, 
then presumably it should be more difficult to imagine activities when forced to adopt the less 
frequent third person perspective. To test this possibility, participants in the present experiment 
were given explicit instructions to imagine imperfective activities from either the first-person or 
the third-person perspective. If our assumptions about perspective taking for activities are 
confirmed, then SCP amplitudes should be more negative when participants imagine activities 
from the third versus first person perspective. 
The current study also employed behavioural measures to investigate the influence of 
perspective taking on ratings of sensory vividness as well as vividness of people, objects, and 
locations. Other crucial event properties investigated included the difficulty associated with 
imagining events, the temporal component of the events imagined (beginning, middle, end), the 
rated importance and duration of the events in the real world, and the number of people and 
objects present in the events. 
 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 42 (34 female) students from Wilfrid Laurier University and other 
persons from the surrounding area, ranging in age from 18-51 years. All participants were right-
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handed native English speakers. Participants were granted course credit or paid $22 for their 
participation. 
Materials 
The experimental stimuli consisted of 46 activity verb statements phrased in the 
imperfective (see Appendix B, Table 4). These phrases began with the pronoun “I”. Each of 
these phrases was preceded by an instruction to imagine the described event from a given 
perspective and then a fixation (“XXXX”). Half of these phrases were preceded by instructions 
to imagine the described event, “From my eyes”, while the other half were preceded by 
instructions to imagine the described event from the perspective, “Looking at self”. 
Two experimental lists were created for counterbalancing purposes. Verb phrases were 
presented in the same order in both lists but with each phrase being preceded by the opposite 
perspective instruction from the other list. Each list also contained 2 additional trials at the 
beginning that served as practice trials. 
A booklet containing a short questionnaire to be answered after every trial (see Appendix 
B, Figure 4) was also provided to each participant. The questions gathered information on 
participants perceptions of 1) vividness (sight, touch, taste, smell, sound) on a 1-7 scale (1 = not 
at all, 7 = very), 2) vividness of people, objects, and locations on a 1-7 scale (1 = not at all, 7 = 
very), 3) the amount of difficulty associated with imagining an event on a 1-7 scale, 4) the 
temporal component of the events imagined (beginning, middle, end), 5) the number of people 
and objects present in the imagined event, 6) the estimation of the duration of the imagined 
events in the real world, and 7) the importance of the imagined events in the real world (1 = not 
at all, 7 = very). 
Procedure 
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The procedure for Experiment 2 was identical to that of Experiment 1, save for two 
differences: Each “Ready?” prompt was followed by an instruction to imagine the event 
described by the coming verb phrase from a given perspective (see Materials); and final word of 
the phrase only remained on the screen for 5 seconds (see Figure 5 for a sample trial with 
timings). The presentation time was reduced form the 8 seconds used in Experiment 1 due to the 
number of blink/movement artifacts that occurred beyond the 5-second mark. Participants were 
also instructed to complete the questionnaires based only on the 5 seconds in which they were 
imagining the events in question. 
EEG Recording 
The electroencephalograph (EEG) was recorded via a cap that contained 64 Ag/AgCl 
electrodes distributed evenly across the scalp (10-20 layout). Electrodes were placed on the left 
infra and supra orbital ridge of each participant as well as the outer canthii. EEG was processed 
through a Neuroscan Synamps2 amplifier, set at a bandpass of 0.05-100 Hz and digitized at 250 
Hz. Electrical impedance was kept below 5 KΩ. 
Results 
EEG Results 
The raw data was re-referenced off-line to the average of the left and right mastoids. A 
low-pass filter set at 30 Hz was applied to remove high frequency noise. Trials contaminated by 
artifacts (blinks, excessive muscle artifact, etc.) were removed before averaging. ERP averages 
were then created for each participant that spanned 200 ms before the onset of the verbs in each 
phrase to 5 seconds following the verbs. For analysis purposes, the averages for all participants 
were separated into 500 ms time segments for the first 2 seconds following the onset of the verbs 
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in the phrases, and then separated into 1000 ms segments for the remaining 3 seconds of the 
imagining period. 
The mean amplitudes for each temporal region were then subjected to a Perspective 
(first-person vs. third-person) X Anteriority (prefrontal vs. frontal vs. central vs. parietal vs. 
occipital) X Hemisphere (left vs. right) X List (1 vs. 2) ANOVA. The electrodes that comprised 
the topographical variables included FP1, FP2, F3, F4, C3, C4, P3, P4, CB1, CB2. All variables 
except for List were within-participant variables. Note that topographical effects are only 
reported below if they interacted with perspective because those are the topographical 
interactions of main theoretical interest. All p-values are reported after Epsilon correction 
(Huynh-Felt) for repeated measures with greater than one degree of freedom. See Appendix D, 
Tables 10-13 and Figures 15-19, for ANOVA results and graphical representations of SCP 
amplitudes. 
0-500 ms time region. The interaction between Perspective and Anteriority was 
marginally significant, F(4,160) = 2.59, p < .07. In prefrontal regions, the third-person 
perspective (M = 3.53 µV) was associated with greater negativity than the first-person 
perspective (M = 3.17 µV), F(1,160) = 6.72, p < .03. A marginal effect was also found in frontal 
regions, in which the third-person perspective (M = 2.39 µV) was again associated with greater 
negativity than the first-person perspective (M = 2.64 µV), F(1,160) = 3.30, p < .09. No other 
effects involving perspective approached significance. 
500-1000 ms time region. A main effect of Perspective was found such that the third-
person perspective was associated with greater negativity than the first-person perspective, 
F(1,40) = 4.90, p < .04. The interaction between Perspective and Anteriority was again 
significant, F(4,160) = 3.62, p < .02. The third-person perspective was associated with greater 
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negativity than the first-person perspective in prefrontal (M = 5.89 µV, M = 7.08 µV; F(1,160) = 
31.12, p < .001), frontal (M = 5.21  µV, M = 6.55  µV; F(1,160) = 39.04, p < .001), central (M = 
4.86 µV), M = 5.56 µV; F(1,160) = 10.73, p < .01), and occipital (M = 2.69 µV, M = 3.63 µV; 
F(1,160) = 19.21, p < .001) regions. No other effects involving perspective were significant. 
1000-1500 ms time region. A main effect of Perspective was found such that the third-
person perspective was associated with greater negativity than the first-person perspective, 
F(1,40) = 4.37, p < .05. The interaction between Perspective and Anteriority was significant, 
F(4,160) = 4.35, p < .01. The third-person perspective was associated with greater negativity 
than the first-person perspective in prefrontal (M = 7.90 µV, M = 9.43 µV; F(1,160) = 28.90, p < 
.001), frontal (M = 6.82  µV, M = 8.49  µV; F(1,160) = 35.36, p < .001), central (M = 5.84 µV), 
M = 6.74 µV; F(1,160) = 10.22, p < .01), and occipital (M = 3.00 µV, M = 4.02 µV; F(1,160) = 
12.95, p < .01) regions. 
1500-2000 ms time region. A main effect of Perspective was found such that the third-
person perspective was associated with greater negativity than the first-person perspective, 
F(1,40) = 4.65, p < .04. The interaction between Perspective and Anteriority was significant, 
F(4,160) = 4.46, p < .01. The third-person perspective was associated with greater negativity 
than the first-person perspective in prefrontal (M = 7.67 µV, M = 9.68 µV; F(1,160) = 38.88, p < 
.001), frontal (M = 6.686  µV, M = 8.532  µV; F(1,160) = 32.88, p < .001), central (M = 5.95 
µV), M = 6.95 µV; F(1,160) = 9.57, p < .01), and occipital (M = 2.65 µV, M = 6.95 µV; 
F(1,160) = 16.95, p < .001) regions. A marginal interaction was found between Perspective and 
Hemisphere, F(1,40) = 3.52, p < .07. This interaction occurred because although the third person 
perspective lead to significantly greater SCP negativity than first person perspective over both 
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the left, F(1,40) = 126.11, p < .001, and right hemisphere, F(1,40) = 73.58, p < .001, this 
difference was larger over the left hemisphere. 
2000-3000 ms time region. The third-person perspective was associated with greater 
negativity than the first-person perspective, F(1,40) = 2.86, p < .10. The interaction between 
Perspective and Anteriority was significant, F(4,160) = 3.98, p < .01. The third-person 
perspective was associated with greater negativity than the first-person perspective in prefrontal 
(M = 7.74 µV, M = 9.84 µV; F(1,160) = 30.33, p < .001), frontal (M = 6.97  µV, M = 8.84  µV; 
F(1,160) = 24.14, p < .001), central (M = 6.76 µV), M = 7.61 µV; F(1,160) = 5.00, p < .04), and 
occipital (M = 2.89 µV, M = 4.43 µV; F(1,160) = 16.36, p < .001) regions. No other effects 
involving perspective were significant. 
3000-4000 ms time region. The interaction between Perspective and Anteriority was 
marginally significant, F(4,160) = 2.36, p = .07. The third-person perspective was associated 
with greater negativity than the first-person perspective in prefrontal (M = 7.25 µV, M = 9.18 
µV; F(1,160) = 18.98, p < .001), frontal (M = 6.41  µV, M = 8.22  µV; F(1,160) = 16.68, p < 
.001), central (M = 6.78  µV, M = 7.63  µV; F(1,160) = 3.71, p < .07), and occipital (M = 2.59 
µV, M = 4.28 µV; F(1,160) = 14.55, p < .001) regions. No other effects involving perspective 
were significant. 
4000-5000 ms time region. The interaction between Perspective and Anteriority was not 
significant. However, the third-person perspective was associated with greater negativity than the 
first-person perspective in prefrontal (M = 6.74 µV, M = 8.14 µV; F(1,160) = 7.08, p < .02), 
frontal (M = 5.48  µV, M = 6.92  µV; F(1,160) = 7.52, p < .02), and occipital (M = 1.59 µV, M = 
3.12 µV; F(1,160) = 8.56, p < .01) regions. No other effects involving perspective were 
significant. 
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Behavioural Results 
The means per condition for each participant on the behavioural measures were subjected 
to a 2 Perspective (first-person vs. third-person) X 2 Participant List (list 1 vs. list 2) ANOVA. 
Perspective was a within-participants variable, whereas List was between participants. 
Perspective-based contrasts were analyzed with paired t-tests and an additional 2 Perspective 
(first-person vs. third-person) X 2 Temporal component (beginning vs. middle vs. end) ANOVA. 
See Appendix D, Tables 14 and 15, for a list of the overall means for the different conditions for 
each of the questions answered and the associated F-values. 
Sensory Vividness. Vividness of touch was found to be more vivid from the first-person 
than from the third-person perspective, t(47) = 2.60, p < .02. A marginally significant effect was 
found in which the first-person perspective was associated with greater vividness than the third-
person perspective for taste, t(47) = 1.8302, p < .08. Marginally significant effects were found in 
which the third-person perspective was associated with higher ratings than the first-person 
perspective for vividness of people (t(47) = 1.77, p < .09) and locations (t(47) = 1.92, p = .06). 
Temporal Components. The main effect of temporal component was significant, F(2,92) 
= 113.87, p < .001. The middle temporal component was more often found to be represented 
than the beginning (t(47) = 7.21, p < .001) and the end temporal component (t(47) = 17.18, p < 
.001). The beginning temporal component was more often represented than the end temporal 
component, t(47) = 7.80, p < .001. 
Behavioural measures yielded no other significant or marginally significant results. 
Discussion 
The present SCP results indicate that imagining activities requires greater cognitive effort 
when imagined from the third-person as compared to the first-person perspective. This effect was 
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evident from 500 ms after the onset of the final word of the phrase (“verbing”) and lasted at least 
another 3500 ms while people continued to imagine the activity. Topographical analysis further 
revealed that event imagination was more difficult from the third-person perspective than from 
the first-person perspective in prefrontal, frontal, central, and occipital regions. Notably, this 
effect was consistently not found for electrode sites located over parietal regions. It is also 
interesting to note, from topographical contrasts, that this effect was observed for prefrontal, 
frontal, and occipital regions in the 3000-4000 ms timeframe but that, in this same timeframe, 
this effect becomes only marginally significant in central regions. In the subsequent 4000-5000 
ms timeframe this effect remains significant in the prefrontal, frontal, and occipital regions, 
while becoming non-significant in central regions. 
Collectively, the observed pattern of SCP negativity indicates that imagining from the 
third-person perspective is associated with greater cognitive effort than imagining from the first-
person perspective across various timeframes and topographical regions. This effect begins in 
prefrontal/frontal regions, becomes more widely distributed across the scalp (with the exception 
parietal regions), and is observed only in prefrontal/frontal and occipital regions in the later 
period of analysis. 
As in Experiment 1, differences in perspective-taking behaviour were associated with 
differences in the cognitive effort required for event representation. While Experiment 1 
established that perspective tendency differed concurrently with changes in cognitive effort, 
Experiment 2 extended this finding by establishing the causality and directionality of this 
relationship. While Experiment 2 focussed on activities, further research is necessary to 
investigate how differences in perspective affect event representation, based on cues that provide 
different temporal information. 
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General Discussion 
The two experiments conducted examined the roles of GA/LA and perspective in 
constraining representations of imagined events. These experiments show that the difficulty of 
event representation is dependent on both of these factors. In Experiment 1, it was predicted that 
people would imagine activities as being ongoing and accomplishments as having ended. It was 
further predicted that a relative increase in cognitive load would be required to imagine activities 
and accomplishments when either type of verb was presented in a form of GA that placed focus 
on a temporal state other than that which is most naturally represented (i.e., the end points of 
activities; the ongoing states of accomplishments). This prediction was confirmed by the SCP 
measures used to index ease of imagining in this study. 
Based on the results of Experiment 1, it was predicted in Experiment 2 that imagining 
activities from the third-person perspective would be more difficult relative to the first-person 
perspective. Using SCP negativity as an index of cognitive load, this was observed to be the 
case. A discussion follows of the findings of both experiments in the context of previous research 
in this area. 
Experiment 1 
The results of Experiment 1 are most consistent with those of Yap et al. (2009), which 
found GA/LA to constrain reaction times in a forced-choice picture task. Experiment 1 builds on 
these findings by showing that GA and LA similarly constrain the imagination of events when 
cued by written stimuli. This experiment also serves to provide electrophysiological evidence of 
the effects of differences in GA/LA on processing and event representation. The consistency of 
results between these two experiments contributes to both studies’ validity and generalizability.  
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The results of the current research also complement research by Larsen and Ferretti 
(2014), on the role played by GA and LA in constraining representations of autobiographical 
memories. Notably, the method used in that study was almost identical to that of the current 
study. The study used verb stimuli categorized into two sets: Standard activity verbs and non-
standard activity verbs. The standard activity verbs used were similar to the activity verbs in the 
current study, while the nonstandard verbs represented a set of verbs distinct from the current 
study’s accomplishment verbs. The nonstandard verbs referred to actions of non-directed motion 
(e.g., run), which may or may not possess natural endpoints depending on context. For example, 
the verb ‘run’ would not possess a natural endpoint in the context of a person going for a run, 
whereas it would possess a natural endpoint were the person running towards the finish line of a 
race. Thus, when presented in isolation, these verbs are more likely to be perceived as lacking a 
natural endpoint. Therefore, as in the current study, these categories represented verbs that 
sometimes possess natural endpoints and verbs that do not. These stimuli were given in the 
imperfective aspect or in the perfect aspect (e.g., I had ran). Like the perfective aspect used in the 
current study, the perfect aspect references events as being completed. Thus, the stimuli used by 
Larsen and Ferretti’s (2014) are similar to those used in the current study in terms of the manner 
in which they convey temporal information. Larsen and Ferretti (2014) observed that GA by LA 
interacted to constrain the representation of autobiographical memories in a pattern similar to 
how GA and LA constrained the representation of imagined events in the current study. Previous 
research, using EEG and fMRI methodologies to compare the neural correlates of real and 
imagined events, has found that many neural regions are commonly recruited for both processes 
(Addis et al., 2007; Conway el al., 2003; Hassabis et al., 2007). As such it is likely that GA and 
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LA constrain representations of autobiographical memories and imagined events in a similar 
manner.  
The SCP results in Experiment 1 also demonstrated either a significant or marginally 
significant interaction between GA and anteriority across all time regions examined. Mean 
amplitudes were more negative for imperfective than perfective aspect at prefrontal and frontal 
locations, whereas amplitudes were more negative for perfective than imperfective aspect at 
posterior locations. During the last second of the measured imagination period, amplitudes were 
more negative for imperfective than perfective aspect at all topographical areas, although this 
difference remained much larger at anterior head locations. 
According to Conway et al. (2001; 2003), left prefrontal cortex activation during the 
process of event construction is associated with the retrieval of knowledge relevant to the real or 
imagined event being represented, while occipital-temporal activation is associated with 
accessing sensory-perceptual information (see Dwivedi, 2006). Thus, the current research 
indicates that event construction based on imperfective phrases is more effortful than 
construction based on perfective phrases. Conversely, sensory-perceptual information is more 
accessible given imperfective cues as compared to perfective cues. Further research is necessary 
for specifying how GA influences the brain mechanisms that underlie the construction and 
content of event representations. 
Previous research has shown that the imperfective, but not the perfective aspect, 
functions to maintain information in working memory (e.g., Magliano & Schleich, 2000), and 
that the imperfective aspect leads to greater activation of the content associated with the ongoing 
nature of events (e.g., Ferretti et al., 2007; Truitt & Zwaan, 1997). It is possible that these 
properties of imperfective aspect contribute to greater difficulty for mechanisms associated with 
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the construction of event representations in general. Furthermore, the content of events has been 
found to be easier to retrieve when events are described as ongoing with imperfective aspect as 
opposed to when those events are referenced as completed with perfective aspect. This difference 
may have led to more negative amplitudes at posterior locations for perfective than imperfective 
aspect. It is also important to keep in mind that the greater negativity for imperfective aspect at 
frontal locations was only found for accomplishments. Thus, it is evident that both LA and GA 
influence the pattern of SCPs at frontal regions. 
The behavioural findings also demonstrated that the people and locations in the imagined 
activities were more vivid when the phrases were in imperfective form than when they were in 
the perfective form. In contrast, GA had no influence on the vividness of people and locations for 
accomplishments. Our findings suggest that when participants imagine events, enhanced 
vividness of people and locations is obtained for the imperfective aspect when the events have an 
ongoing nature and no natural, temporal endpoint. These findings are consistent with Ferretti et 
al.’s (2007) finding of enhanced activation of location knowledge for imperfective events. 
Accomplishments and activities differentially influenced vividness for the different event 
properties examined. For example, accomplishment phrases led to higher vividness ratings for 
people and locations, and also higher ratings for sensory attributes of sight, sound and taste. In 
contrast, activity phrases led to higher vividness ratings for imagined objects and the sensory 
attribute of touch. It is important to note, however, that the two types of verbs are composed of 
completely different verbs, denoting events with different content. In other words, a different set 
of accomplishments and activities may produce a different pattern of vividness simply because 
the content of those events are different. This fact makes the GA contrasts within the different 
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verb types much more theoretically interesting in general because we can examine the effect of 
aspect on identical events (see Becker et al., 2013, for a similar argument). 
The ratings for how important the imagined events would be if they were to actually 
occur demonstrated that the accomplishments were considered more important events than the 
activities. More important events are known to elicit more vivid event recollections (Conway & 
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) and therefore it is not surprising that the accomplishments were rated 
higher on most vividness measures than were activities. Participants also rated the activities as 
having longer “real world” durations than the accomplishments. Finally, participants indicated 
that they imagined more people for accomplishment phrases, but a similar amount of objects for 
both verb types. The imperfective aspect was found to increase the number of objects present in 
the imagined events, but this effect was only found for activity verbs. 
Our behavioural results for the event temporal components imagined (beginning, middle, 
end) demonstrated the people were far more likely to imagine the middle of the events than the 
beginning and end components. GA and LA influenced the frequency of the temporal 
components imagined, however. As expected, participants indicated they imagined the end of the 
events more often when they were described with perfective aspect than with imperfective 
aspect. In contrast, the imperfective aspect led to a greater increase in the number of middle 
event components imagined, but this increase was only found for activities. These findings 
confirm the influence of GA on focussing on different temporal components of events, and also 
show that the existence of natural temporal endpoints matters for how GA influences the 
frequency in which people imagine the middle period of events. 
The behavioural results demonstrated that both GA and LA contributed to the perspective 
(first vs. third person) and content of the imagined events. Participants were more likely to 
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imagine activities than accomplishments as if they were actually experiencing the event unfold in 
front of their eyes (first person perspective) as opposed to looking at themselves (third person 
perspective). Recall that one of the crucial differences between activities and accomplishments is 
that the former do not have natural endpoints and thus have a natural ongoing property 
associated with them. Our findings suggest that the ongoing nature of activities leads to imagined 
event representations that are consistent with how people actually experience events (i.e., from 
the first person perspective). 
A second important finding was that GA had a greater effect on event perspective for 
accomplishments than for activities. Specifically, participants were more likely to imagine 
themselves participating in accomplishment events from the first person perspective when those 
events were described as completed as opposed to ongoing. Accomplishments are events that 
involve a process that leads to a goal being obtained (i.e., “to build”, the goal is obtained when 
something is built). Our results suggest that when the goal is obtained, as when the phrases were 
described with perfective aspect, people imagine the obtained goal as if looking from their own 
eyes. Interestingly, GA had no influence on the perspective taken when imagining activities. This 
finding for activities may be the result of these events not having a different event structure at the 
beginning and end as they have no natural endpoints (Becker et al., 2013).  
Taken together, these findings show that events that are naturally ongoing or that 
naturally have a goal that is obtained, lead to event representations that are consistent with 
reliving the events (i.e., embodied) as opposed to a third person (or disembodied perspective). As 
such, our findings extend previous research examining perspective-taking while forming event 
representations (Avraamides & Kelly, 2005; D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2012; Eich et al., 
2009; Ferretti & Katz, 2010; Nigro & Neisser, 1983; Valenti, Libby, & Eibach, 2011). 
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The present findings regarding perspective-taking tendencies are especially notable when 
contrasted with those of Larsen and Ferretti (2014), which used a similar methodology to 
investigate the manner in which grammatical aspect and lexical aspect constrain 
autobiographical memory recall. Unlike the results of the current study, Larsen and Ferretti did 
not find changes in GA and LA to lead to differences in perspective recruitment. This apparent 
discrepancy was likely due to the fact that Larsen and Ferretti (2014) used standard and 
nonstandard activity verbs (i.e., non-directed motion verbs that are also sometimes 
accomplishments). In the current study, a difference in perspective recruitment rate was found 
between activity-based and accomplishment-based representations. Unlike accomplishment 
verbs, which always refer to events with natural endpoints, non-directed motion verbs are 
unlikely to be perceived as possessing natural endpoints when not used in contexts which 
reference is explicitly made to a natural endpoint (Levin, 1993). As the previous study provided 
no such context to participants, it is reasonable to conclude that non-directed verbs may, more 
frequently than accomplishment verbs, be perceived as standard/activity verbs that do not have 
natural endpoints. As such, they may be associated with rates of perspective recruitment more 
similar to those seen for standard activity verbs than for accomplishment verbs or with 
recruitment rates lying in between those associated with standard/activity and accomplishment 
verbs. 
Another possibility is that the observed differences in perspective rates is due to the 
difference in the nature of the task performed in each study. While the current study had 
participants imagine events, participants in the previous study were to recall autobiographical 
memories. As an autobiographical memory is a representation of a personally experienced past 
event, such a memory was necessarily experienced previously from the first-person perspective. 
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It has been shown previously that altering the perspective of representation diminishes spatial 
memory ability (Mou, McNamara, Valiquette, & Rump, 2004) and makes less efficient use of 
cognitive resources than maintaining the original perspective or representation (Avraamides & 
Kelly, 2005). Thus, changing perspectives is counter-productive, in terms of effective and 
efficient memory recall, and accordingly unlikely to occur during this process. In contrast, a 
representation of an imagined event is not inherently associated with the first-person perspective. 
Without this constraint, it is likely that imagined events are more often associated with the third-
person perspective than are recalled autobiographical memories. This may explain why GA/LA-
dependent differences in perspective recruitment were observed in the current study on imagined 
events, but not in the previous study on autobiographical memory. 
Experiment 2 
In Experiment 1, it was found that imagining activities lead to the greatest frequency of 
first-person perspective use. Experiment 2 builds on these results by manipulating the 
perspective used by participants during the process of imagining activities. In this way, examined 
the impact of perspective on event imagination, in isolation of the impact of GA and LA. 
The main finding of Experiment 2 was that SCP amplitudes were consistently more 
negative for third-person than for first-person perspective in prefrontal, frontal, central, and 
occipital regions. However, this difference was not observed in parietal regions. A possible 
explanation for the difference pattern at parietal regions comes from participant-reported ratings 
of sensory vividness. The senses of smell, sound, taste, and touch would be expected to diminish 
with decreasing physical proximity. A representation from the third-person perspective 
necessarily involves the usage of a viewpoint that is at least somewhat physically removed from 
the representation of the self, taking part in the cue-described action. Thus, vividness of smell, 
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sound, taste, and touch would be expected to be lesser for third-person than for first-person 
representation. Indeed, behavioural measures showed vividness of touch to be greater for first-
person versus third-person perspective representation. There was also a trend towards greater 
vividness from the first-person versus the third-person perspective for smell, sound, and taste. 
The aforementioned absence of a perspective-based difference in parietal regions may be 
explained by the increased cognitive effort required to represent these senses with a greater 
degree of vividness for the first-person than for the third-person perspective.  
A possibility for why differences in vividness of taste, smell, and sound did not reach 
statistical significance is due to the particular list of verbs used in this study. As uncovering 
differences in sensory vividness was not the primary focus of this study, the currently employed 
verbs were not designed to evoke events that feature any particular sense with a great degree of 
salience. It is hypothesized that these differences would reach statistical significance, given a 
stimulus list featuring a variety of sensory-rich events.  
Unlike with the aforementioned sensory measures, ratings for vividness of sight were 
found not to differ at all according to perspective of representation. A possible explanation for 
the absence of a difference for the sense of sight is that this sense is typically diminished 
significantly only by physical distances exceeding those that an individual would be expected to 
naturally employ during event representation (i.e., It is unlikely that an individual would 
spontaneously take a third-person viewpoint from a distance that would make it difficult to see 
the event he/she is trying to view). According to Conway et al. (2003), increased visual imagery 
should be reflected by increased SCP negativity in temporal-occipital regions. It was found in the 
current study that third-person representation produced greater negativity than first-person 
representation in occipital regions. While this could be interpreted as third-person representation 
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requiring greater cognitive effort, this is perhaps not the case. Based on behavioural results, it 
may be that third-person representation leads to greater negativity, regardless of topographical 
region, and that this difference was not obscured, as it was in parietal regions, by differences in 
sensory vividness. 
A number of previous examinations have used fMRI to investigate how changes in 
perspective use are reflected in the fMRI blood-oxygen-level dependent (BOLD) response, in 
various neural regions, during the representation of autobiographical memories (Eich et al., 
2009; Freton et al., 2013). This body of research has found perspective-related differences in a 
number of neural regions. In all regions in which perspective-related responses were found, 
response levels were either equivalent for first-person and third-person perspective recall or were 
greater for first-person than for third-person perspective recall. SCP negativity has previously 
been taken as an indicator of neural activation, including sub-cortical activation (Conway et al., 
2001; Skinner & Yingling, 1976) as indicated by BOLD responses (He & Raichle, 2009; Nagai 
et al., 2004). Thus, the SCP amplitudes recorded in the current study may be indicative of a 
similar difference in activation as that observed in previous research. 
The current study also provides novel insight regarding the time course of event 
representation from different perspectives, which is not possible with the temporal resolution of 
fMRI. As such, the results of the current research extend those of past fMRI investigations into 
the process of imagining events by examining how this process is constrained by differences in 
temporal information. Overall, the results of the current study are consistent with previous 
research on visual perspective, which have found topographical and behavioural differences 
associated with the use of different perspectives. 
Conclusion 
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Combined, the two experiments investigated how event representations are constrained 
by temporal information associated with verbs and by the visual perspective of representation. 
This research used SCP amplitudes as an index of the cognitive ease of event imagining. The 
results of this research indicate that both of these factors play a key role in determining the 
amount of cognitive effort required to imagine an event. As such, this study represents a novel 
extension of previous research on GA/LA and visual perspective, providing new information on 
the processing of temporal information in language from different visual perspectives. 
Future research will be aimed at further investigating event representation from different 
perspectives based on cues that vary by temporal information. This research will further employ 
the forced-perspective paradigm, developed for Experiment 2, to investigate perspective-based 
differences in forming event representations, based on cues in different forms of GA/LA.  
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Appendix A 
Experiment 1 Materials 
Table 1 
Experiment 1 Activity Verbs 
scrounge battle kiss party 
elope flirt debate fish 
volunteer shop huddle study 
hunt loiter play struggle 
visit teach vacation fidget 
act collaborate splash exercise 
read watch cuddle golf 
camp dissent squabble gamble 
pet ml cooperate pray 
compete date plot consult 
listen lounge pretend  
train meet speak  
 
Table 2 
Experiment 1 Accomplishment Verbs 
dust shovel fabricate recreate 
mow style derive coil 
invent recite mend rake 
produce organize pour vacuum 
squish manufacture polish create 
dig build bend chop 
design draw shred drink 
construct knit paint form 
sketch alter eat trim 
compress sweep prepare wash 
pack compute type  
concoct compos calculate  
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Table 3 
Experiment 1 Expected Pattern of Results 
 
 Imperfective Perfective 
Activity + - 
Accomplishment - + 
Note. The “+” and “-” signs refer to a relative SCP positivity and a relative SCP negativity, 
respectively, during the process of event imagination. This pattern of results also applies to the 
response times observed in Yap et al., 2009. For this study “+” and “-” refer to faster and slower 
reaction times to picture times, respectively. 
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Figure 1. Experiment 1 Behavioural Questionnaire 
  
From which perspective was the imagined 
event viewed?
From my eyes Looking at self
Rate how vivid your sensory experience was in the imagined event, from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much):
Sight _____ Touch _____ Taste _____ Smell _____ Sound _____
How vivid were the people/entities in 
the imagined event from 1 (not at all) to 
7 (very much)? _____
How vivid were the objects in the 
imagined event from 1 (not at all) to 7 
(very much)? _____
How vivid was the location of  the imagined event from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very 
much)? _____
Which components of  the event did you 
imagine? (Circle all that apply)
Beginning Middle End
How many people/entities were 
involved in the imagined event? _____
How many objects were present in the 
imagined event? _____
How long would the imagined event 
take if  it actually occurred? _____
Rate how important the imagined event 
would be if  it actually occurred: _____
Imagined Event Cue: __________________________
From which perspective was the imagined 
event viewed?
From my eyes Looking at self
Rate how vivid your sensory experience was in the imagined event, from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much):
Sight _____ Touch _____ Taste _____ Smell _____ Sound _____
How vivid were the people/entities in 
the imagined event from 1 (not at all) to 
7 (very much)? _____
How vivid were the objects in the 
imagined event from 1 (not at all) to 7 
(very much)? _____
How vivid was the location of  the imagined event from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very 
much)? _____
Which components of  the event did you 
imagine? (Circle all that apply)
Beginning Middle End
How many people/entities were 
involved in the imagined event? _____
How many objects were present in the 
imagined event? _____
How long would the imagined event 
take if  it actually occurred? _____
Rate how important the imagined event 
would be if  it actually occurred: _____
Imagined Event Cue: __________________________
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Figure 2. Experiment 1 Stimulus Example  
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Introduction  
Stephanie and Kate had been best friends all through grade school and high school. 
Right after her senior year of high school, Kate’s family moved to the West coast. 
It had been years since they had seen each other. 
Finally, Stephanie decided it was time for a visit. 
She was on her way to the airport when she got a flat tire. 
Aspect sentence 
Stephanie was changing the flat tire. (imperfective) 
Stephanie changed the flat tire. (perfective) 
Post-aspect sentences 
She was worried about being late for her flight. 
She thought about how upset Kate would be. 
She decided she would have to catch a later flight. 
Conclusion 
Stephanie was unable to get to the airport on time. 
She was extremely disappointed. 
Later that day she heard that the plane crashed. 
She was relieved not to be on the flight. 
Critical test question 
Is Stephanie back on her way to the airport yet? 
Figure 3. Magliano and Schleich (2000) Example Stimulus 
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Appendix B 
Experiment 2 Materials 
Table 4 
Experiment 2 Verbs 
scrounge battle kiss party 
elope flirt debate fish 
volunteer shop huddle study 
hunt loiter play struggle 
visit teach vacation fidget 
act collaborate splash exercise 
read watch cuddl golf 
camp dissent squabble gamble 
pet mingle cooperate pray 
compete date plot consult 
listen lounge pretend  
train meet speak  
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Figure 4. Experiment 2 Behavioural Questionnaire 
  
Rate how vivid your sensory experience was in the imagined event, from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much):
Sight _____ Touch _____ Taste _____ Smell _____ Sound _____
Rate how vivid the people/entities were.
1 (not at all) to 7 (very much) _____
Rate how vivid the objects  were.
1 (not at all) to 7 (very much) _____
Rate how vivid the location was.
1 (not at all) to 7 (very much) _____
Rate how difficult it was to imagine the event.
1 (not at all) to 7 (very much) _____
Which components of  the event did you 
imagine? (Circle all that apply)
Beginning Middle End
How many people/entities were 
involved? _____
How many objects were present?
_____
How long would the imagined event 
take if  it actually occurred? _____
Rate how important the imagined event 
would be if  it actually occurred (1-7): _____
Imagined Event Cue:  
________________________
Perspective of  imagined 
event:
Looking from my eyes ❍
Looking at self ❍
Rate how vivid your sensory experience was in the imagined event, from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much):
Sight _____ Touch _____ Taste _____ Smell _____ Sound _____
Rate how vivid the people/entities were.
1 (not at all) to 7 (very much) _____
Rate how vivid the objects  were.
1 (not at all) to 7 (very much) _____
Rate how vivid the location was.
1 (not at all) to 7 (very much) _____
Rate how difficult it was to imagine the event.
1 (not at all) to 7 (very much) _____
Which components of  the event did you 
imagine? (Circle all that apply)
Beginning Middle End
How many people/entities were 
involved? _____
How many objects were present?
_____
How long would the imagined event 
take if  it actually occurred? _____
Rate how important the imagined event 
would be if  it actually occurred (1-7): _____
Imagined Event Cue:  
________________________
Perspective of  imagined 
event:
Looking from my eyes ❍
Looking at self ❍
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Figure 5. Experiment 2 Stimulus Example 
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Appendix C 
Experiment 1 Results 
Table 5 
Experiment 1 SCP Results ANOVA (0-1500 ms) 
Effect 0-500 ms 500-1000 ms 1000-1500 ms 
GA F(1,48)=2.807 F<1 F<1 
LA F<1 F(1,48)=4.067* F(1,48)=1.449 
Anteriority F(4,192)=2.819† F(4,192)=15.344***** F(4,192)=26.305***** 
Laterality F<1 F<1 F(1,48)=4.53* 
GA × LA F(1,48)=2.002 F(1,48)=4.898* F(1,48)=6.758* 
GA × Anteriority F(4,192)=3.041* F(4,192)=8.115*** F(4,192)=10.232***** 
GA × Laterality F<1 F<1 F(1,48)=1.521 
Laterality × Anteriority F<1 F<1 F(4,192)=1.142 
LA × Anteriority F<1 F<1 F<1 
LA × Laterality F<1 F<1 F<1 
GA × LA × Anteriority F<1 F<1 F(4,192)=1.673 
GA × LA × Laterality F<1 F(1,48)=1.747 F<1 
GA × Anteriority × 
Laterality F<1 F<1 F(4,192)=1.188 
LA × Anteriority × 
Laterality F(4,192)=1.952 F<1 F(4,192)=1.046 
GA × LA × Anteriority × 
Laterality F<1 F<1 F<1 
*p< .05, **p<.01, ***p<.001,****p<.005, *****p<.0005, †.05<p>.10 
  
TIME, PERSPECTIVES, VERBS, AND IMAGINING EVENTS 78 
 
Table 6 
Experiment 1 SCP Results ANOVA (1500-3000 ms) 
Effect 1500-2000 ms 2000-2500 ms 2500-3000 ms 
GA F<1 F<1 F<1 
LA F<1 F<1 F<1 
Anteriority F(4,192)=21.428***** F(4,192)=14.798***** F(4,192)=9.452***** 
Laterality F(1,48)=5.35* F(1,48)=3.993† F(1,48)=4.788* 
GA × LA F(1,48)=6.142* F(1,48)=7.407** F(1,48)=3.9† 
GA × Anteriority F(4,192)=4.846**** F(4,192)=2.572† F(4,192)=2.689† 
GA × Laterality F(1,48)=1.79 F<1 F<1 
Laterality × Anteriority F(4,192)=1.226 F(4,192)=1.059 F<1 
LA × Anteriority F<1 F<1 F<1 
LA × Laterality F<1 F<1 F<1 
GA × LA × Anteriority F<1 F<1 F<1 
GA × LA × Laterality F<1 F<1 F<1 
GA × Anteriority × 
Laterality F(4,192)=1.349 F(4,192)=1.113 F(4,192)=1.042 
LA × Anteriority × 
Laterality F(4,192)=1.296 F(4,192)=1.18 F<1 
GA × LA × Anteriority × 
Laterality F<1 F<1 F<1 
*p< .05, **p<.01, ***p<.001,****p<.005, *****p<.0005, †.05<p>.10 
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Table 7 
Experiment 1 SCP Results ANOVA 3000-6000 ms) 
Effect 3000-4000 ms 4000-5000 ms 5000-6000 ms 
GA F<1 F<1 F(1,48)=2.807 
LA F<1 F<1 F<1 
Anteriority F(4,192)=6.793***** F(4,192)=4.422* F(4,192)=2.819† 
Laterality F(1,48)=3.164† F(1,48)=1.151 F<1 
GA × LA F(1,48)=2.896† F(1,48)=1.484 F(1,48)=2.002 
GA × Anteriority F(4,192)=2.487† F(4,192)=2.341† F(4,192)=3.041* 
GA × Laterality F(1,48)=1.962 F<1 F<1 
Laterality × Anteriority F<1 F<1 F<1 
LA × Anteriority F<1 F<1 F<1 
LA × Laterality F<1 F<1 F<1 
GA × LA × Anteriority F<1 F<1 F<1 
GA × LA × Laterality F<1 F<1 F<1 
GA × Anteriority × 
Laterality F(4,192)=1.267 F<1 F<1 
LA × Anteriority × 
Laterality F(4,192)=1.11 F(4,192)=1.586 F(4,192)=1.952 
GA × LA × Anteriority × 
Laterality F<1 F<1 F<1 
 *p< .05, **p<.01, ***p<.001,****p<.005, *****p<.0005, †.05<p>.10
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Table 8 
Experiment 1 Behavioural Means 
Measure 
Activities 
Imperfective 
Activities 
Perfective 
Accomplishments 
Imperfective 
Accomplishments 
Perfective 
Perspective (%) 63.7 65.6 53.7 58.0 
Sight (1-7) 4.778 4.811 4.922 4.998 
Smell (1-7) 1.956 2.028 2.001 2.017 
Sound (1-7) 3.353 3.346 3.909 3.821 
Taste (1-7) 1.51 1.435 1.542 1.594 
Touch (1-7) 3.749 3.744 3.392 3.397 
Location Vividness (1-7) 4.21 4.085 4.527 4.592 
Object Vividness (1-7) 4.683 4.601 4.146 4.137 
People Vividness (1-7) 4.013 3.842 4.454 4.436 
Beginning 0.37 0.366 0.386 0.383 
Middle 0.822 0.785 0.829 0.824 
End 0.225 0.311 0.202 0.264 
People (Number) 4.368 4.211 10.351 9.261 
Objects (Number) 6.053 8.89 8.01 9.097 
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Table 9 
Experiment 1 Behavioural Results ANOVA 
Measure GA LA GA × LA 
Perspective (%) F(1,48)=3.208 F(1,48)=27.328***** F<1 
Sight (1-7) F(1,48)=1.37 F(1,48)=15.202***** F<1 
Smell (1-7) F(1,48)=1.285 F<1 F<1 
Sound (1-7) F(1,48)=1.01 F(1,48)=50.894***** F<1 
Taste (1-7) F<1 F(1,48)=4.562* F(1,48)=1.624 
Touch (1-7) F<1 F(1,48)=28.884***** F<1 
Location Vividness (1-
7) 
F<1 F(1,48)=40.028***** F(1,48)=3.263† 
Object Vividness (1-7) F(1,48)=1.161 F(1,48)=44.103***** F<1 
People Vividness (1-7) F(1,48)=3.178† F(1,48)=66.503***** F(1,48)=2.193 
Beginning F(1,48)=6.17* F<1 F<1 
Middle F<1 F(1,48)=23.83***** F<1 
End F(1,48)=2.968† F<1 F<1 
People (Number) F(1,48)=3.208 F(1,48)=27.328***** F<1 
Objects (Number) F(1,48)=1.37 F(1,48)=15.202***** F<1 
*p< .05, **p<.01, ***p<.001,****p<.005, *****p<.0005, †.05<p>.10  
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Figure 6. Experiment 1 activity SCP amplitudes 
 
Figure 7. Experiment 1 accomplishment SCP amplitudes 
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Figure 8. Experiment 1 GA/LA-dependent differences in SCP amplitudes (0-500 ms) 
   
Figure 9. Experiment 1 GA/LA-dependent differences in SCP amplitudes (500-1000 ms; 
significant at the p<.05 level)  
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 Figure 10. Experiment 1 GA/LA-dependent differences in SCP amplitudes (1000-1500 ms; 
significant at the p<.05 level) 
   
Figure 11. Experiment 1 GA/LA-dependent differences in SCP amplitudes (1500-2000 ms; 
significant at the p<.05 level)  
0	  
0.5	  
1	  
1.5	  
2	  
2.5	  
3	  
3.5	  
4	  
4.5	  
5	  
Ac+vi+es,	  
Imperfec+ve	  
Ac+vi+es,	  Perfec+ve	   Accomplishments,	  
Imperfec+ve	  
Accomplishments,	  
Perfec+ve	  
µV	  
0	  
0.5	  
1	  
1.5	  
2	  
2.5	  
3	  
3.5	  
4	  
4.5	  
5	  
Ac+vi+es,	  
Imperfec+ve	  
Ac+vi+es,	  Perfec+ve	   Accomplishments,	  
Imperfec+ve	  
Accomplishments,	  
Perfec+ve	  
µV	  
TIME, PERSPECTIVES, VERBS, AND IMAGINING EVENTS 85 
 
 
 Figure 12. Experiment 1 GA/LA-dependent differences in SCP amplitudes (2000-2500 ms; 
significant at the p<.01 level) 
   
Figure 13. Experiment 1 GA/LA-dependent differences in SCP amplitudes (2500-3000 ms; 
marginally significant at p<.10)  
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Figure 14. Experiment 1 GA/LA-dependent differences in SCP amplitudes (3000-4000 ms; 
marginally significant at p<.10)  
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Appendix D 
Experiment 2 Results 
Table 10 
Experiment 2 SCP Results ANOVA (0-500 ms) 
Effect 0-500 ms 
Perspective F<1 
Anteriority F(4,160)=46.817***** 
Laterality F<1 
Perspective × Anteriority F(4,160)=2.589† 
Perspective × Laterality F(1,40)=1.964 
Laterality × Anteriority F(4,160)=2.826* 
Perspective × Anteriority × Laterality F<1 
*p< .05, **p<.01, ***p<.001,****p<.005, *****p<.0005, †.05<p>.10 
Table 11 
Experiment 2 SCP Results ANOVA (500-1500 ms) 
Effect 500-1000 ms 1000-1500 ms 
Perspective F(1,40)=4.901* F(1,40)=4.37* 
Anteriority F(4,160)=18.414***** F(4,160)=27.972***** 
Laterality F<1 F(1,40)=5.664* 
Perspective × Anteriority F(4,160)=3.617* F(4,160)=4.349** 
Perspective × Laterality F(1,40)=2.498 F(1,40)=2.629 
Laterality × Anteriority F<1 F(4,160)=1.051 
Perspective × Anteriority × Laterality F<1 F(4,160)=1.014 
*p< .05, **p<.01, ***p<.001,****p<.005, *****p<.0005, †.05<p>.10 
Table 12 
Experiment 2 SCP Results ANOVA (1500-3000 ms) 
Effect 1500-2000 ms 2000-3000 ms 
Perspective F(1,40)=4.645* F(1,40)=2.863† 
Anteriority F(4,160)=19.745***** F(4,160)=12.762***** 
Laterality F(1,40)=5.429* F(1,40)=2.721 
Perspective × Anteriority F(4,160)=4.457** F(4,160)=3.979** 
Perspective × Laterality F(1,40)=3.517† F(1,40)=1.937 
Laterality × Anteriority F(4,160)=1.161 F(4,160)=1.208 
Perspective × Anteriority × Laterality F(4,160)=1.128 F(4,160)=1.458 
*p< .05, **p<.01, ***p<.001,****p<.005, *****p<.0005, †.05<p>.10  
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Table 13 
Experiment 2 SCP Results ANOVA (3000-5000 ms) 
Effect 3000-4000 ms 4000-5000 ms 
Perspective F(1,40)=2.008 F(1,40)=1.046 
Anteriority F(4,160)=8.049**** F(4,160)=6.58**** 
Laterality F<1 F<1 
Perspective × Anteriority F(4,160)=2.361 F(4,160)=1.623 
Perspective × Laterality F<1 F<1 
Laterality × Anteriority F(4,160)=1.094 F<1 
Perspective × Anteriority × Laterality F(4,160)=1.187 F(4,160)=1.425 
*p< .05, **p<.01, ***p<.001,****p<.005, *****p<.0005, †.05<p>.10 
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Table 14 
Experiment 2 Behavioural Means 
Measure 
First-Person 
Perspective 
Third-Person 
Perspective 
Sight (1-7) 4.993 4.976 
Touch (1-7) 3.416 3.164 
Taste (1-7) 1.471 1.339 
Smell (1-7) 1.869 1.780 
Sound (1-7) 3.812 3.733 
People Vividness (1-7) 4.280 4.429 
Object Vividness (1-7) 3.995 3.921 
Location Vividness (1-7) 4.354 4.515 
Difficulty (1-7) 2.888 2.841 
Beginning (%) 38 40 
Middle (%) 79 78 
End (%) 14 16 
People (Number) 15.983 31.451 
Objects (Number) 8.966 10.082 
Duration (Seconds) 1081262.107 1328378.252 
Importance (1-7) 3.258 3.280 
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Table 15 
Experiment 2 Behavioural Results Paired t-tests 
Measure Perspective 
Sight (1-7) t(47)=0.289 
Touch (1-7) t(47)=2.601* 
Taste (1-7) t(47)=1.83† 
Smell (1-7) t(47)=1.509 
Sound (1-7) t(47)=1.174 
People Vividness (1-7) t(47)=1.77† 
Object Vividness (1-7) t(47)=0.878 
Location Vividness (1-7) t(47)=1.923† 
Difficulty (1-7) t(47)=0.698 
Beginning (%) t(47)=0.778 
Middle (%) t(47)=0.570 
End (%) t(47)=1.427 
People (Number) t(47)=0.931 
Objects (Number) t(47)=0.356 
Duration (Seconds) t(47)=0.632 
Importance (1-7) t(47)=0.307 
*p< .05, **p<.01, ***p<.001,****p<.005, *****p<.0005, †.05<p>.10 
TIME, PERSPECTIVES, VERBS, AND IMAGINING EVENTS 91 
 
 Figure 15. Experiment 2 SCP amplitudes 
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Figure 16. Experiment 1 GA/LA-dependent differences in SCP amplitudes (500-1000 ms; 
significant at the p<.05 level) 
  
Figure 17. Experiment 1 GA/LA-dependent differences in SCP amplitudes (1000-1500 ms; 
significant at the p<.05 level) 
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Figure 18. Experiment 1 GA/LA-dependent differences in SCP amplitudes (1500-2000 ms; 
significant at the p<.05 level) 
   
Figure 19. Experiment 1 GA/LA-dependent differences in SCP amplitudes (2000-3000 ms; 
marginally significant at the p<.05 level) 
 
0	  
1	  
2	  
3	  
4	  
5	  
6	  
7	  
8	  
First	   Third	  
µV	  
0	  
1	  
2	  
3	  
4	  
5	  
6	  
7	  
8	  
9	  
First	   Third	  
µV	  
